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THE MANAGER’S SHARE
DAVID I. WALKER*

ABSTRACT
It is sometimes argued in the corporate governance literature that the total share of
corporate value that can be extracted by a manager is fixed and independent of the
avenues through which value is extracted. Shareholders need not worry about an activity
such as insider trading, the story goes, because any profits achieved by a manager
through insider trading will simply offset conventional compensation. This article
challenges that idea and argues that whether one views the manager’s share as being
capped by external market forces, set by an optimal principal/agent contract, or limited
by saliency and outrage in accordance with a managerial power view of corporate
governance, the total value that can and will be appropriated by managers will be a
function of the number and type of avenues through which value can be appropriated.
Although the foregoing theories provide the same overall prediction that
additional avenues of appropriation increase total managerial appropriation, the factors
affecting the magnitude of the effect depend on the model or mechanism employed. For
example, potential avenues of appropriation that are easily monitored and under the
unilateral control of the directors, such as bonuses or perks, should have little affect on
incremental appropriation under an optimal contracting model, but could have significant
impact under a managerial power model. A review of the relevant empirical literature
suggests that additional avenues of appropriation do indeed lead to greater overall
appropriation. The evidence, moreover, is largely inconsistent with the optimal
contracting view.
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INTRODUCTION
It is sometimes argued in the corporate governance literature that the total share of
corporate value that can be extracted by a manager is independent of the avenues through
which value is extracted. Easterbrook and Fischel put it this way:
Managers with the power to pay themselves can take their profits only
once. They can’t take it in salary, and a second time in options, and a
third time in trading profits, and a fourth time in perks. Grant that
managers can wring so much from investors; then they will take it, and the
division between trading profits and skyboxes to football games matters
only if the form of compensation has efficiency properties.1
This article challenges the idea that the manager’s share is fixed. I argue that
whether one views managerial appropriation as being capped by external market forces,
set by an optimal principal/agent contract, or limited by saliency and outrage in
accordance with a managerial power view of corporate governance, the total value that
can and will be appropriated by managers will be a function of the number and type of
avenues through which value can be appropriated. To be sure, some avenues of
appropriation are less problematic under one model of corporate governance than
another, but the bottom line conclusion is the same – channels of appropriation matter.
Resistance to the fixed slack argument is not novel. Many commentators have
approached various corporate governance arrangements under the assumption that total
appropriation increases as channels of appropriation increase.2 A primary contribution of
this article, however, is to provide a rigorous analysis of and rebuttal to the fixed
appropriation view.
The mechanism that controls the manager’s share of corporate wealth is not
perfectly understood. The optimal contracting model of the managerial agency
relationship posits that the principal (the board of directors on behalf of the shareholders)
can only imperfectly observe the effort, focus, and effectiveness of its agent (the
manager) and negotiates a contract that minimizes the resulting agency costs, that is, the
costs of 1) contracting with the manager, 2) monitoring the manager’s performance, 3)
bonding by the manager to maximize shareholder value, and 4) the residual slack or
divergence that remains between the actions selected by the manager and those that
would optimally benefit the shareholders.3

1

Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 262
(1991). Easterbrook and Fischel are far from being alone in this view. As discussed infra Part I, a number
of respected scholars have made similar arguments.
2
See, e.g., Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 998, 999, 1023, 1033 (1981) (suggesting without explicit explanation that managerial
compensation arising from the taking of corporate opportunities would be in addition to conventional
compensation).
3
See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308 (1976), discussed infra Part III.
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Recently, two colleagues and I have set forth a managerial power theory of
managerial slack that can be seen as supplementing the optimal contracting theory. 4
Under the managerial power theory, appropriation by strong managers is limited by the
outrage that excessive appropriation causes among financial analysts, institutional
investors, and other corporate governance watchdogs. Outside directors are sensitive to
this outrage and limit managerial compensation accordingly. As a result, managers have
an incentive to camouflage compensation in order to limit outrage.5
Under both of the aforementioned theories there is an overriding cap on
managerial value extraction that is determined by external market forces – markets for
corporate control, capital, products, and even the managerial labor market. However,
external market forces generally are thought to permit considerable slack, leaving one to
question the extent to which such forces actually limit appropriation.6
Given the controversy concerning which mechanism actually limits managerial
appropriation, this article considers the impact of additional avenues of value
appropriation under each theory. I first analyze the external market forces that are seen
as placing an upper bound on managerial appropriation and rendering channels of
appropriation irrelevant. If managerial labor and takeover markets limited appropriation
and if these markets were perfectly transparent and competitive, avenues of appropriation
would not affect a manager’s overall share. Rational managers would themselves select
the most efficient compensation arrangement in order to appropriate as much firm value
as possible without triggering market discipline. Managers would reject inefficient
compensation and would be forced to trade off equally efficient forms dollar for dollar.7
Markets are imperfect, however, and far from transparent. But the fact that there
is market slack means only that managers would be able to take more under this model; it
does not mean that channels matter. Presumably, managers operating under a slack
market forces limitation would still maximize their share and trade off one form of
efficient compensation for another dollar for dollar, albeit at a higher overall level.
Additional opaque avenues of appropriation affect total appropriation under this model,
however, because each new channel undermines the effectiveness of these external
market forces. Legalizing insider trading, for example, would weaken managerial labor
market discipline and permit increased managerial appropriation because private
monitoring of insider trading would be difficult and costly.8
Next, I consider the effect of additional appropriation channels under an optimal
contracting model. Stickiness in external market forces suggests that there often will be a
significant gap between the minimum amount of compensation required to attract and
retain a manager – the reservation wage – and the external market forces limitation on
4

See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751 (2002); see also Lucian
Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance (2004).
5
See infra Part IV.A.
6
See infra Part II.B.
7
See infra Part II.A.
8
See infra Part II.B.
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appropriation. Shareholders, or boards of directors acting for them, may be able to hold
appropriation and agency costs to a level below the external market forces limitation
through aggressive monitoring and the use of incentive compensation. The optimal
contracting model posits that shareholders will minimize agency costs through this
internal labor “market.”9
A simple thought experiment demonstrates why additional avenues of
appropriation lead to greater total appropriation under the optimal contracting theory.
First, imagine a case in which a manager is paid with a mix of cash and options and has
no opportunity to extract pecuniary value through any other channel, e.g., has no
opportunity to engage in insider trading, self-dealing, or appropriation of corporate
opportunities; but the manager can enjoy the private benefits of loafing and perquisites,
which the directors cannot perfectly observe. Under the optimal contracting theory, the
parties’ contract would balance the manager’s private benefit opportunities, risk aversion,
and the cost and effectiveness of incentive compensation and would optimize the package
of cash and options, the level of monitoring, and the amount of residual slack.
Now add a new avenue of value appropriation. Imagine that self-dealing becomes
feasible.10 Self-dealing can conceivably benefit shareholders as well as managers, but
because the incidence and extent of value diversion through self-dealing cannot be
perfectly observed, self-dealing also can result in significant appropriation by
management. Thus, shareholders may wish to limit or even prohibit self-dealing
contractually, and a new optimal contract will be written. The manager’s share of firm
value may increase in two ways. First, the level of incentive compensation may increase
in the new environment. If the level of incentive compensation under the old contract
was optimal, it will not remain optimal in the new environment because the manager has
a new source of private benefits that can be achieved through self-dealing and, unless
adjusted, no additional shareholder wealth-maximizing incentives. Second, given
diminishing returns on contracting and monitoring investment, some excess self-dealing
will be permitted under the new optimal contract. Total agency costs will be higher in
the new environment, but these costs will be borne by the principal. The manager-agent
may benefit through enhanced incentive compensation and residual self-dealing
opportunities.11
Finally, I consider the effect of additional channels of appropriation under a
managerial power model of corporate governance. The managerial power model
recognizes that directors are not perfect agents of shareholders and presents a less
optimistic view of corporate behavior. Like the optimal contracting model, the
managerial power view posits that appropriation is only loosely constrained by the
external market forces discussed above. The upper limit on appropriation under the
managerial power view is set not by optimal contracting, but by investor and financial

9

See infra Part III.A.
Self-dealing could become feasible through a change in legal rules or through a change in
corporate or individual circumstance.
11
See infra Part III.D.
10
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press outrage borne by outside directors.12 Avoiding transparency and salience is central
to maximizing appropriation under this model. Thus, it is a fairly straightforward
implication of the managerial power model that increasing the number of avenues of
slack will increase total managerial appropriation, because appropriation of total value X
through straight salary will be more salient and outrageous than appropriation of the same
amount through a multiplicity of channels. However, certain channels of appropriation
(insider trading, perks) are more easily camouflaged than others (straight salary). Thus,
under this model, the types of appropriation channels available to management may be as
or more important than the number of avenues available.13
In sum, whether one believes that managerial appropriation is capped by external
market forces, by an optimized contract, or by salience and outrage, increasing the
avenues of appropriation should increase the total value appropriated. This is an
important claim because if the fixed appropriation view is right and avenues are
irrelevant, there may be little or no reason to regulate insider trading, self-dealing, or the
taking of corporate opportunities. The implication of additive appropriation, on the other
hand, is that total managerial appropriation is partly a function of the number and types of
appropriation avenues available. The foregoing analysis may help explain why corporate
law creates certain blanket prohibitions, such as the prohibition against insider trading,
which limit avenues of appropriation.
Although the theories provide the same overall prediction that additional avenues
of appropriation increase total managerial appropriation, the factors affecting the
magnitude of the effects depend on the model or mechanism employed. Under the
optimal contracting model, the important factors include the difficulty of direct
monitoring, the intensity of private benefits, and the ability of directors to just say no.
Avenues of appropriation that can be eliminated by directorial fiat, such as perks and
benefits, should have little or no impact on total appropriation under this model.
Particularly troubling under an optimal contracting model are avenues effectively under
the control of the managers, such as insider trading, self-dealing, and the taking of
corporate opportunities.14 Under the managerial power theory, the key issues are the
opacity of the value transferred through an additional avenue of appropriation, which is
similar but not identical to monitoring difficulty, and the extent to which transfers can be
plausibly justified as enhancing shareholder value. The value of certain complex benefit
plans, for example, may be opaque to outside observers but easily monitored by
shareholder-loyal directors. Such benefits present much more of an opportunity for
incremental appropriation under the managerial power model than the optimal
contracting model.15 If external market forces actually cap appropriation, the extent to
which an additional avenue of appropriation undermines those forces is key, and
difficulty of external monitoring would again be important.16

12

See Bebchuk et al, supra note x, at 786-87, and infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
14
See infra Part III.D.
15
See infra Part IV.B.
16
See infra Part II.B.
13
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Thus, one’s level of concern with multiplying channels of managerial
appropriation may depend on which theory or mechanism one believes best describes the
contracting environment. As a corollary, empirical evidence concerning the extent to
which additional avenues of appropriation add to total appropriation should shed light on
the persuasiveness of the various governance theories. This article analyzes numerous
forms of current and potential value appropriation through this lens and considers the
limited empirical evidence bearing on these issues.
The empirical evidence supports the view that channels matter. First, additional
channels of compensation lead to more total compensation. Second, the additional
compensation represents at least some appropriation of shareholder value; it is not simply
a fair and efficient splitting of incremental firm value resulting from the inclusion of a
share value-enhancing form of compensation. Moreover, the evidence largely is
inconsistent with the optimal contracting model. Channels that should lead to little or no
incremental appropriation under this model, because they are easily monitored and under
the unilateral control of the directors, significantly increase total appropriation.17
For example, a recent study of bonuses paid to executives for completing
acquisitions finds no relationship between deal performance and the size of the bonus
paid.18 These deal bonuses do not appear to enhance shareholder value, and as a result,
they should not increase overall managerial appropriation under a fixed appropriation
view or even under the optimal contracting model, because they are easily monitored and
the directors can eliminate them if they are inefficient. The study finds, however, that
these bonuses do increase total appropriation; they do not simply replace other forms of
compensation.19 This result suggests that the managerial power model better explains the
deal bonus evidence than the optimal contracting model.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Part I describes the fixed
appropriation view through examples of its invocation and importantly defines what I
mean by the term “appropriation.” Part II presents and critiques the view that external
market forces cap total managerial appropriation and that, as a result, avenues of
appropriation are irrelevant. Part III considers the effect of additional avenues of
appropriation within an optimal contracting framework assuming that boards of directors
can improve upon the limitation supplied by external market forces. Part IV provides the
same analysis under a managerial power view of corporate governance arrangements. In
Part V, I consider the limited empirical evidence bearing on the fixed appropriation
question and the governance theories discussed. The weight of the evidence suggests that
channels matter. Part VI briefly considers the implications of the theory and empirical
evidence for shareholder advocates as well as policy makers. Part VII concludes.
Before launching into the first substantive section of the article, let me say a word
about my normative perspective. This article takes the view that the goals of corporate
17

See infra Part V.
See Yaniv Grinstein & Paul Hribar, CEO Compensation and Incentives – Evidence from M&A
Bonuses 3 (working paper, 2003).
19
See id. at 12-13.
18
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law and corporate law scholarship should be maximization of shareholder value; not as
an end in itself, but because rewarding investors encourages capital formation and grows
the economic pie for all of us. Managers certainly should be compensated, fairly and
creatively, for their contribution to the corporate enterprise, but the manager’s share
should be no larger (or smaller) than that necessary to maximize shareholder value.
I. THE FIXED APPROPRIATION VIEW AND APPROPRIATION DEFINED
Opponents of mandatory corporate law rules prohibiting certain managerial
activities, such as insider trading, self-dealing, or the taking of corporate opportunities (or
apologists for the lack of such prohibitions), sometimes argue that the total share of
corporate value that can be appropriated by a manager is fixed and independent of the
avenues through which value is appropriated. Shareholders need not worry about an
activity such as insider trading, the story goes, because any profits achieved by a manager
through insider trading will simply offset salary, bonus or other forms of conventional
compensation. This Part provides several examples of the deployment of the fixed slack
view and then prefatory to analysis of the effect of potential avenues of managerial
appropriation on total appropriation defines exactly what is meant by the term
“appropriation.”
A. The Fixed Appropriation Argument Deployed
The “fixed appropriation” or “fixed slack” argument has been invoked in a variety
of contexts. The Easterbrook and Fischel passage quoted in the introduction is taken
from their analysis of the potential costs and benefits of deregulating insider trading,20 but
as the quotation suggests, it could apply to any avenue of managerial appropriation.
Salary, options, perks, and insider trading just scratch the surface. In fact, in another
article, the authors make the same fixed appropriation argument in the context of a
manager appropriating a corporate opportunity.21
Dennis Carlton and Daniel Fischel also invoke the fixed slack argument in their
analysis of insider trading,22 as do David Haddock and Jonathan Macey, who specifically
focus on the role of the managerial labor market in reducing other compensation for
insider trading gains.23 Economist Nejat Seyhun has summarized this theory as follows:

20

See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note x, at 262.
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale L.J.
698, 734 (1982) (“Managers properly take opportunities for themselves when they can exploit them more
profitably than the firm…. [T]he manager takes the venture, and the firm reduces the manager’s other
compensation.”).
22
See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 Stan. L. Rev.
857, 862-63 (1983) (arguing that managers and firms will allocate inside information efficiently in the face
of competitive markets).
23
See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1449, 1461-62 (1986) (assuming that insider trading gains will be offset dollar for dollar by salary
reductions for risk-neutral, replaceable managers and by something less than dollar for dollar reductions
once risk aversion is factored into the analysis).
21
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“In competitive managerial markets, potential managers will incorporate the additional
benefits of insider trading into their wage contracts, thereby bidding their wages lower.”24
Recently, Einer Elhauge has argued that contributions to a manager’s pet charities
likely substitute for other forms of compensation and thus do not erode shareholder value.
His view is that managerial discretion to make such contributions is unlikely to affect the
overall level of agency costs, “because, while shareholders cannot monitor specific
operational decisions or determine whether managers are maximizing profits,
shareholders can and do monitor the overall level of corporate profitability.”25
Albert Choi has recently presented a theoretical model of golden parachute
arrangements that explains the devices as mechanisms for shifting executive
compensation from target firm shareholders onto acquiring firms. Central to his
argument is the idea that shareholders can reduce traditional executive compensation by
the expected value of the parachute payments.26
These are just a few representative examples of analyses predicated on a fixed
appropriation view. Many others can be found in the corporate governance literature.
However, commentators propounding this view seldom develop the argument fully or
discuss the specific mechanism that they believe caps appropriation and renders sources
irrelevant.27 The next three Parts discuss three mechanisms – external market forces,
optimal contracting, and outrage and saliency in accordance with a managerial power
view of corporate governance – that may limit managerial appropriation and evaluates the
fixed appropriation argument under each of them. Before turning to these mechanisms,
however, it is important to define exactly what I mean by managerial appropriation.
B. Appropriation Defined
Defining “appropriation” is easy if firm value is unaffected by the form of
compensation provided to the manager. However, if, as Easterbrook and Fischel put it,
various forms of compensation have differing “efficiency properties,”28 the problem is
much more complex. Let us begin with the case in which corporate value is independent
of the form of compensation. Then, if a manager receives more total compensation as a
result of being offered a new form of compensation, we would say that the difference
represents incremental appropriation. This is a zero-sum, fixed economic “pie” situation,
so any incremental gain by the manager represents a transfer from the shareholders.

24

See H. Nejat Seyhun, The Effectiveness of the Insider-Trading Sanctions, 35 J. Law & Econ.
149, 150 (1992).
25
See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest 47 (working paper, Aug.
17, 2004).
26
See Albert Choi, Golden Parachute as a Compensation-Shifting Mechanism, 20 J.L. Econ. &
Org. 170 (2004).
27
David Haddock and Jonathan Macey’s analysis of insider trading is an exception. See Haddock
& Macey, supra note x, at 1461 (arguing that managerial labor market competition would drive down an
insiders direct compensation to reflect profits achieved through insider trading).
28
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note x, at 262.
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The analysis is more complicated if a new form of compensation provides share
value-enhancing incentives or tax savings or otherwise results in a larger pie. Now the
fact that a manager gains does not necessarily imply that the shareholders lose. The
manager and shareholders may be dividing the incremental gains. Does this mean that
shareholders should not worry about the manager’s share of incremental gains from new
forms of compensation as long as the shareholders remain whole? I do not think so.
Although it is more difficult to define appropriation in this scenario, I would argue that at
a minimum incremental appropriation occurs whenever managers capture 100% of
incremental gains or managers fail to “pay” for the low risk elements of new
compensation.
There are several ways that one might think about incremental appropriation in
the “growing pie” scenario. One might compare the percentage of firm value received by
the manager before and after the introduction of a new value-enhancing compensation
mechanism, but this seems arbitrary since there was nothing sacred about the original
sharing of firm value. However, if the manager receives 100% of incremental firm value
resulting from the adoption of a new form of compensation, the manager has at least
appropriated the entire opportunity, although the shareholders are no worse off. I do not
think we can say anything about the degree of incremental appropriation in this scenario,
however, for the reason given above.
However, there is one “growing pie” scenario in which we can comfortably define
and test for incremental appropriation. Suppose a manager initially receives only a cash
salary of 100. Now suppose that the manager is offered a bonus based on company
performance. Under the bonus formula, company performance will be assessed as “low,”
“medium,” or “high,” and the associated bonus will be 10, 30, or 50, respectively.
Because the manager is guaranteed a bonus of 10, she should be willing to give up at
least this amount of salary in exchange for the bonus opportunity. Under the optimal
contracting framework that is discussed in Part III, we would expect the directors to
require the manager to give up at least this amount.29 Thus, if there is no adjustment to
the manager’s base salary in this scenario, we can define the overlapping risk-free
compensation to be incremental managerial appropriation.
A “fixed pie” assumption appears to underlie the fixed appropriation literature,
and I generally will assume that additional avenues of appropriation have no affect on
firm value as I analyze the effect of these avenues on overall managerial appropriation in
the next several Parts. As we have seen, defining appropriation in this context is noncontroversial. Incremental managerial compensation equals incremental appropriation.
In Part V, however, I will relax the fixed pie constraint and consider whether the

29

In brief, the optimal contracting model assumes that the principal (the directors on behalf of the
shareholders) minimizes agency costs, which include the cost of managerial compensation. Agency costs
exceed the manager’s reservation wage because the directors cannot perfectly observe the manager’s effort
or focus. Thus, the directors invest in monitoring and accept a certain amount of residual slack. Under this
model, however, the directors can offer the manager a package including the bonus and reduced salary,
and, under these assumptions, even the most risk-averse manager would accept the package.
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empirical evidence points to incremental appropriation with respect to arguably valueenhancing compensation.
II. THE EXTERNAL MARKET FORCES LIMITATION AND FIXED
APPROPRIATION
This Part first develops the external market forces limitation argument and then
discusses various objections that can be levied against it. I show that market forces
would cap total managerial appropriation and render channels of appropriation irrelevant
if managerial labor and corporate control markets were perfectly competitive and
transparent. However, given imperfect markets, high transaction costs, and, in particular,
opacity, this Part demonstrates that the number and type of avenues of appropriation that
are available directly impact external market forces limitations on appropriation and that
additional avenues generally undermine the discipline of market forces and lead to
increased total appropriation.
A. The External Market Forces Limitation Argument
Four market forces have been described that tend to limit managerial
appropriation of shareholder value – managerial labor, corporate control, capital, and
products markets.30 Judge Easterbrook sees these markets disciplining managers “almost
as if there were an invisible hand.”31 I will focus primarily on the managerial labor and
corporate control markets, as I see these as the most plausible external market
mechanisms for limiting managerial appropriation.
Imagine an industry that is highly competitive along many dimensions – an
industry marked by fierce product and labor competition (including executive “labor”
competition) and competition for capital. Imagine that control contests are inexpensive
and frequently launched. Imagine that managerial compensation is transparent. In such
an imaginary industry,32 market forces would limit managerial appropriation even if
corporate directors provided no discipline at all.
1. Managerial Labor Market (Reputation)
A perfectly transparent and competitive managerial labor market in which
managerial talent is fungible would provide a cap on appropriation that would render
channels of appropriation irrelevant in the manner suggested by Easterbrook and Fischel.
Suppose that a manager, given her appetite for risk, is willing to accept a pay package
30

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theory and Evidence,
9 Del. J. Corp. L. 540 (1984).
31
See id. at 544.
32
I am unaware of any industry that fully fits this description. The computer industry often
exhibits fierce product competition, but as the recent Oracle contest for PeopleSoft suggests, control
contests are not always easy or inexpensive in that industry. [Cite. WSJ?] The airline industry is marked
by cutthroat product competition as well, but executive compensation in that industry is not particularly
transparent. Compensation is probably most transparent in regulated utilities, but utilities generally are
insulated from control contests and strong product competition.
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including fixed salary of X and incentive compensation with expected value Y. If the
manager attempts to appropriate additional compensation of Z through a new channel, the
directors can simply refuse or they can reduce her salary to reflect the un-bargained for
appropriation. If the manager persists and refuses to renegotiate, the directors can replace
her with a comparable manager.33 As a result, the manager could not increase her overall
share of corporate value by exploiting the new channel of appropriation.
Suppose, however, that the manager is insulated from being fired from her present
position or having her compensation adjusted. A perfectly competitive labor market still
would impose this level of discipline on the manager and render channels of
appropriation irrelevant, as long as the manager had ambitions beyond her present
position or was likely to reenter the labor market for any reason.34 In a competitive labor
market, a manager who appropriates excessive compensation as CEO of ABC Co.
through non-conventional channels would find the conventional compensation offered to
her by XYZ Co. reduced accordingly.35 The prospect of this ex post settling up would
induce a rational manager to limit appropriation of shareholder value during her tenure as
CEO of ABC Co. Ultimately, this is a story about reputation, and taken to an extreme
implies that no explicit measures are needed to discipline managers.36
This essentially external, reputational mechanism should be distinguished from
internal levers, such as incentive compensation and opportunities for promotion, which
also provide labor market discipline. The strength of these internal forces depends on the
strength of internal corporate governance, which I will discuss in presenting the optimal
contracting and managerial power models in Parts III and IV.
2. The Market for Corporate Control
The market for corporate control is seen as disciplining managerial appropriation
in a similar fashion. In a perfectly functioning and transparent market, managerial
appropriation would be fully reflected in a company’s share price. Any deviation of the
share price from the optimal level would create an arbitrage opportunity for competing

33

See id. at 543.
There would be a final period problem under this model. If discipline derives solely from the
prospect of new employment, a manager nearing retirement would not be deterred from utilizing additional
channels of appropriation to increase her total share. [Cite.]
35
See Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in Handbook to Industrial
Organization 94 (R. Schmalensee & R. D. Willig eds., 1989) (summarizing Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288 (1980)). In a less than perfectly competitive
labor market, the effect can be reversed for several reasons: First, XYZ Co. may be forced to match or
better the compensation (explicit or implicit) received by the CEO of ABC Co. to lure her away. Thus,
greater total compensation at ABC may lead to greater total compensation at XYZ. Second, greater
appropriation by ABC’s CEO may serve as an (inaccurate) signal of quality. Third, given the reliance on
executive compensation benchmarks, increased appropriation by ABC’s CEO and others like her may lead
to a ratcheting up of executive compensation across the board. See John M. Bizjak, Michael L. Lemmon &
Lalitha Naveen, Has the Use of Peer Groups Contributed to Higher Levels of Executive Compensation?
(working paper, Nov. 15, 2000) (describing and providing evidence of the ratcheting phenomena).
36
See Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note x, at 94.
34
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managers who could initiate a control contest and replace existing management.37 Thus,
managers that failed to maximize shareholder value, either through poor decision making
or through appropriating an excessive portion of the pie, would face an external risk, even
if the company’s directors imposed no discipline.
Channels of appropriation would be largely irrelevant in the face of an ideal
takeover market. If the share value maximizing managerial compensation package
consists of salary of X and incentive compensation of Y, a manager who appropriated an
additional amount Z through a non-conventional channel would have to give up other
compensation or face the risk of ouster. Judge Easterbrook envisions teams of potential
managers monitoring existing managers looking for these arbitrage opportunities.38
Knowing that they are being watched and are at risk of losing control through a tender
offer or proxy contest, incumbent managers, he believes, tend to act in the shareholders’
interest.39
3. Capital and Products Markets
The capital and products markets could further assist in capping overall
managerial appropriation and rendering channels of appropriation irrelevant. Takeovers
aside, capital markets play a separate role in disciplining managers. Managers that must
enter the capital markets to raise funds will find that poor performance or excessive
appropriation, or the risk thereof, raises their cost of capital. This effect provides
discipline for a going concern if it envisions raising new capital40 and also for a new firm.
According to Judge Easterbrook, managers that are taking a firm public will attempt to
bond themselves to reasonable appropriation in order to reduce the cost of capital.41
Finally, products markets may impose some discipline on managers. If
managerial slack results in poorer performance in the market for a company’s products,
bankruptcy may ensue, which would leave the manager without a job and with an
unfavorable reputation. Even short of bankruptcy, lack of competitiveness in products
markets hurts share value, increasing the risk of takeover, and reducing the amount of
firm value available for managerial appropriation.42
B. Objections to the Market Forces Limitation Argument
A number of objections can be raised to the argument that market forces limit
managerial appropriation and that avenues of appropriation are irrelevant. The most
common objection is that these markets are not perfectly competitive, leaving managers
with significant slack. While true, this observation does not fully rebut the “fixed
appropriation” argument. If imperfections in these markets allow managers to
37

See Easterbrook, supra note x, at 564; Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note x, at 97.
See Easterbrook, supra note x, at 564.
39
See Easterbrook, supra note x, at 564; Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note x, at 97.
40
See Easterbrook, supra note x, at 556
41
See id. at 543
42
See id. at 543, 557
38
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appropriate more than they would under a perfect market assumption, managers can be
expected to push compensation to the limits permitted by these slack markets. At this
point, however, further appropriation would trigger the discipline of the external market
forces and bring us back to the fixed appropriation result. Thus, a more nuanced rebuttal
is required.
The Easterbrook and Fischel passage suggests that avenues of appropriation
matter if there are efficiency differences.43 Presumably what they mean is that if one
form of appropriation provides share value-enhancing incentives while another does not,
the choice of compensation affects managerial and shareholder wealth. If appropriation
were transparent, however, efficiency differences would have little effect. External
market forces would cause managers to select the most efficient compensation package in
order to maximize appropriation. Efficiency does matter under a market forces limitation
model, but only in an evolutionary sense. The invention of a more efficient form of
compensation, such as stock options, increases the pie for everyone, managers and
shareholders. In a static analysis, however, inefficient forms of appropriation should be
squeezed out under this model.
Although efficiency is something of a red herring under this model, opacity is not.
Once we relax the assumption that appropriation is transparent, it can be readily
demonstrated that additional avenues of appropriation generally undermine the
effectiveness of external market forces and increase the total appropriation permitted by
these forces even if a new channel is no more inefficient (or opaque) than an existing
channel.
1. Imperfect Markets Result in Significant Slack
Markets are sticky. Replacing a manager means incurring search and training
costs. Raiders are required to offer a significant premium to market price to wrest control
from management. As a result, the market forces “cap” on managerial appropriation is
barely a cap at all. These are the conventional responses to the market forces argument,
and, to be fair, proponents of deregulation recognize that markets are imperfect. Judge
Easterbrook, for example, has written that “[n]one of the competitive devices is costless
or perfect. Indeed, all are quite costly, and all together leave room for occasional fraud
and managerial slack.”44
It is instructive to examine in more detail the sources of slack resulting from
imperfect market discipline. The limitation on appropriation arising from the managerial
labor market depends in part on the cost of replacing the manager.45 If the manager has a
great deal of firm-specific knowledge that will be difficult for a replacement to acquire or
if search costs are high, the cost of replacing him will be high and slack significant. Of
course, managerial performance as well as appropriation factors into the replacement

43

See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note x, at 262.
See Easterbrook, supra note x, at 542.
45
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note x, at 33.
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decision. Difficulties in monitoring and evaluating performance further muddy the signal
and generally weaken the discipline of this market.
More generally, one can question the efficiency of the managerial labor market,
particularly the CEO labor market. An efficient market requires many buyers and sellers
engaged in fairly anonymous, independent transactions.46 The CEO market, by contrast,
is thin. The number of candidates that a Fortune 500 firm would consider in a CEO
search would be few,47 and the number of openings each year, although perhaps growing,
is few as well.48 Rakesh Khurana argues that CEO search committees often become
obsessed with attracting a particular candidate, which undermines efficient bargaining.49
Moreover, the CEO selection process is subject to a great deal of internal political and
social pressure, and boards of directors of major companies (and CEO candidates) have
to be extremely careful with regard to secrecy and confidentiality, factors which further
impair the efficiency of this market.50
Slack in the discipline provided by the market for corporate control also is a
function of cost. Takeovers are expensive. In recent years, takeover premiums have
averaged 30% or more.51 But this figure probably underestimates the amount of slack
allowed by the takeover market, because a new owner would face agency costs as well.52
He cannot run the firm by himself. Thus, appropriation representing a deviation of, say,
30% of firm value from some “normal” level of agency costs and slack would be needed
to justify a takeover.
Several factors limit the disciplining force of the capital markets. Judge
Easterbrook suggests that the prospect of an IPO will cause managers to bond themselves
in the company charter to reasonable appropriation.53 But even if this is so, the force of
this discipline is likely to wane over time as changes in legal rules and the business
environment open up new avenues of appropriation.54
46

See Rakesh Khurana, Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for Charismatic
CEOs 27 (2002).
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See id. at 27-28.
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See Mark R. Huson et al, Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term
Perspective, 61 J. Fin. 2265, 2275 (2001) (finding a modest increase in CEO turnover in large public
companies between 1971 and 1994 from 10.7% annually to 11.2% annually, but finding a noticeable
increase in forced successions); see also Murphy, supra note x, at 2549 (noting an increase in external
replacement of CEOs).
49
See id. at 180.
50
See id. at 32-48.
51
See Lisa K. Muelbroek & Carolyn Hart, The Effect of Illegal Insider Trading on Takeover
Premia, 1 European Fin. Rev. 51, 61 (1997) (finding average takeover premia of 32% for a sample of
acquisitions occurring in the 1980s in which illegal insider trading was not detected and an average premia
of 43% for a matched set of firms with detected insider trading); Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts
Seriously: The Implications of “Discounted” Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 Colum. L. Rev.
891, 908 (1988) (citing studies from the 1980s reporting takeover premia in excess of 50%).
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See Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note x at 97 (asking: “Why would the new management behave
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See Easterbrook, supra note x at y.
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In fact, the prospect of a changing business and legal environment will make it very difficult for
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But what about subsequent trips to the capital markets? Won’t the prospect of
having to raise new money provide discipline? No, not to a significant extent. First, the
cost of issuing new debt will be increased only to the extent that excess appropriation is
large enough to affect a company’s risk of insolvency and debt rating.55 Managerial
appropriation is more a question of dividing the pie between managers and shareholders.
Second, because mature public companies rarely make equity offerings,56 a company’s
cost of equity capital is unlikely to be affected by midstream increases in managerial
appropriation. Finally, even if a firm makes a later trip to the public equity market or
suffers an increase in its cost of debt, any additional cost of capital is borne by the
shareholders pro rata, not by the manager alone.57
Product markets seem a very remote mechanism for imposing discipline on
managerial appropriation. First, excessive managerial appropriation may not have any
bearing on a firm’s success in the product markets. Some avenues of appropriation, such
as managerial self-dealing or the taking of corporate opportunities could conceivably
impact competitiveness, but most will not.58 In addition, the incremental risk of
bankruptcy resulting from excessive managerial appropriation generally will be slight.
The foregoing discussion suggests that external market forces often will permit a
significant degree of slack.59 But showing that there is slack in the market forces
limitations does not sufficiently rebut the fixed appropriation claim. Avenues of slack
could still be irrelevant to total managerial appropriation whether external forces working
perfectly limit the total to X or working imperfectly limit appropriation to X + Y. If
market forces cap appropriation at some level, channels conceivably could be irrelevant
to total appropriation.
2. Appropriation Efficiency and External Market Forces

company. It will be difficult for a manager to tie his own hands without tying up the company as well and
risking foregoing profitable business opportunities. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note x, at 325.
55
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1466 (1992); but see Naveen D. Daniel et al, The
Hidden Cost of Managerial Incentives: Hidden Costs from the Bond and Stock Markets (working paper,
Sept. 2004) (finding that firms that use more powerful incentive compensation incur greater debt costs and
that this higher debt cost is not offset by reductions in executive perk consumption or selection of higherrisk, positive NPV projects. Thus, share value suffers as a result of high-powered, suboptimal incentives.)
56
Equity offerings made subsequent to IPOs, known as seasoned equity offerings, are rare because
these offerings are viewed in the market as a signal of bad news and “last resort” financing. See Richard A.
Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 418-19 (7th ed. 2003).
57
See Bebchuk et al, supra note x, at 778.
58
See id. at 778; Bebchuk, supra note x, at 1466-67.
59
In addition to these arguments, Lucian Bebchuk has argued persuasively that managers will not
be constrained by external market forces with respect to significantly redistributive issues, such as
compensation. With respect to these issues, managers are likely to accept the small risk of takeover or
ouster associated with a dollar for dollar transfer of value from shareholders to managers. See Bebchuk,
supra note x, at 1461-67.
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Easterbrook and Fischel suggest that sources of appropriation affect shareholder
and manager wealth if there are differences in “efficiency properties.”60 The idea,
presumably, is that some forms of appropriation, such as stock options, create share
value-enhancing incentives, while other, perhaps skyboxes, do not, and that given
efficiency differences, the choice of compensation matters. Under the assumption of
perfect markets and transparent compensation, however, efficiency properties would only
affect total managerial appropriation in an evolutionary sense. At any time, external
market forces would cause managers both to limit their appropriation and to select the
most efficient form or forms of appropriation.
Suppose, for example, that the takeover market effectively caps CEO
compensation at ABC Co. and that the CEO presently receives 100% incentive
compensation with value of 20, producing net shareholder value of 100. If shareholder
value falls below 100, a takeover will ensue. Now suppose that the CEO has access to
perks worth 5 and that these perks represent a pure value transfer from the shareholders.
If the CEO takes the perks in addition to his current level of incentive compensation,
share value falls to 95, triggering a takeover. In order to take perks and avoid triggering a
takeover, the CEO must reduce his incentive compensation, but that also reduces firm
value. Suppose reducing his incentive compensation to 15 produces net firm value of
103 prior to taking the perks. The CEO could then take 3 in perks and maintain net
shareholder value of 100. But, of course, the CEO’s total compensation is reduced to 18.
More generally, an external market forces limitation on managerial appropriation would
cause the executive to select the most efficient appropriation arrangement in order to
maximize appropriation.61
On the other hand, even given assumptions of perfect markets and transparency,
changes in legal rules or evolution in compensation technology involving efficiency
differences would affect the manager’s share over time. First, imagine an environment in
which incentive compensation is legally prohibited and firms offer only straight salary
compensation. Now imagine that all constraints are lifted and companies begin offering
stock and option incentives. Because incentive compensation is riskier than salary and
managers generally are risk averse, companies would have to offer packages with greater
expected value to induce managers to make the switch.62 But assuming that incentive
compensation is effective in increasing shareholder wealth, paying managers more
through incentive compensation could be attractive. Shareholders could benefit in two
ways. First, existing managers would react to incentive compensation by working harder,
60

See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note x, at 262.
The manager would maximize his utility, not his income, but it is unlikely that a manager would
value perks equally with cash compensation. Because cash can be used to purchase anything, including
perks, the cash equivalent should always be more valuable to the manager. See M. Todd Henderson &
James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous
Consumption 15, 28(working paper, 2004) (recognizing that perks generally will be discounted by
executives but proposing that in certain circumstances perks could be worth more than their cash equivalent
because mental accounting allows an executive to enjoy a perk that he would not be willing to purchase
with cash).
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being more creative, or taking greater risks. Second, individuals with the appropriate
skills and risk preferences would migrate towards these jobs. For both reasons, as
Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy point out, “[p]aying CEOs ‘better’ would eventually
mean paying the average CEO more.”63
Of course, one could respond that the markets force firms and managers to adopt
the most efficient compensation package given existing compensation technology and
legal rules and that increased managerial remuneration in this scenario is not necessarily
“appropriation” as I have defined it, since the change enhances share value. And I would
agree. My point, here, however, is simply to suggest that within a market forces
framework, evolution in legal rules or technology can indeed result in managers taking
their profits once in salary and a second time in options.
3. Opaque Appropriation Undermines Market Discipline
The most problematic assumption relied upon in concluding that an external
market forces limitation on appropriation would render channels of appropriation
irrelevant is not that avenues are equally efficient, but that they are transparent.
Generally they are not. Additional avenues of appropriation – particularly opaque
appropriation – undermine the discipline imposed by external market forces and result in
greater total managerial appropriation under a more nuanced analysis. This effect has
little to do with efficiency.
Suppose, for example, that taking perks and self-dealing both represent dollar for
dollar transfers from shareholders to managers and that the two avenues are equally
inefficient in terms of increasing shareholder wealth. According to Easterbrook and
Fischel, whether a manager appropriates value X through perks, self-dealing, or a
combination of both is a matter of indifference to shareholders.64 Shareholders will not
be indifferent, however, if access to an additional avenue of appropriation undermines the
discipline provided by market forces.
Legal prohibitions provide extra-contractual enforcement mechanisms and
sanctions that can reduce the cost to a company or to the markets of monitoring
managerial behavior.65 Many of the avenues of appropriation that are (or formerly were)
prohibited under mandatory corporate law, such as insider trading and self-dealing, are
difficult to monitor directly. The value appropriated is not transparent. Imagine that
insider trading is legalized, that some companies choose to regulate or even prohibit the
practice contractually while others do nothing, and that managers increase appropriation
via this channel generally. How will this affect market discipline?
63
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The managerial labor market will not work as effectively as it did prior to
revocation of the prohibition. Given relaxed sanctions (firing versus firing, jail, and
fines), managers will be tempted to disguise their trades and violate contractual rules
prohibiting or limiting insider trading.66 It will be more difficult for both internal and
external monitors to determine how much a given manager is appropriating in total.
Hidden appropriation has no effect on a manager’s reputation. All else being equal, the
cap on total appropriation imposed by the managerial labor market is raised with the
introduction of a new channel of value appropriation that is opaque and difficult to
monitor.
The discipline offered by the takeover, capital, and products markets will be
undermined as well. First, reduced compensation transparency undermines the
effectiveness of the takeover market just as it does the managerial labor market. If a
takeover would be triggered by excessive managerial compensation, hiding some of that
compensation makes it more difficult for potential acquirers to identify promising targets.
It might be argued that executive compensation, even if opaque, is reflected in a
company’s share price, and that it is share price and not compensation per se that triggers
takeovers. If the first assertion is true, however, one must ask why companies have
fought so vigorously against proposed accounting rules requiring stock option
compensation to be expensed rather than simply footnoted.67 Assuming imperfect
markets, obscured compensation is likely to undermine the discipline offered by the
market for corporate control.
Even if a new channel of appropriation has little direct effect on the effectiveness
of the takeover market, an avenue that is opened up by removal of the legal prohibition
has a second, across-the-board effect on appropriation. All companies face the same
change in environment and roughly the same increase in monitoring costs. The
management team put in place by a successful raider will face the same temptation to
trade on inside information, for example.68 All firms in the capital markets and products
markets face similar increases in managerial appropriation. This is the dark side of the
changes in legal rules idea discussed above. Even if market forces fix appropriation
within a given set of legal rules and business environment, all bets are off when the rules
or environment change.
Of course, difficulty of monitoring or opacity could be considered part of the
“efficiency properties” alluded to in Easterbrook and Fischel’s caveat. However, the
problem discussed here is not a function of differences in opacity or monitoring
66

See id.
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difficulty. Each new avenue of appropriation adds to the monitoring burden faced by
shareholders and markets and further undermines market discipline. Even if a current
channel and potential new channel of appropriation are similar in opacity, they likely will
present separate monitoring challenges and will have additive, negative impacts on
market discipline. The effects of insider trading and self-dealing on managerial
appropriation might be similar in magnitude, for example, but efforts spent in directly
monitoring insider trading may have little impact on self-dealing and vice versa, and
determining appropriation via these two avenues will be independent problems.
Market forces certainly play a role in constraining managerial appropriation and
in some cases may cause channels of appropriation to be irrelevant. The question is how
hard or how often these constraints “bite.” If two channels of appropriation are already
open and are currently being utilized, it probably makes little difference if a manager
appropriates a little more via avenue “A” and less via “B.” However, if one avenue
represents a change in compensation technology or legal rules or if a new avenue is
opened that undermines the discipline of the markets, managers may indeed increase their
total appropriation under this model. Opacity appears to be the most important
determinant of the extent to which an additional channel of appropriation is likely to
increase total managerial appropriation if external market forces actually set the cap.
III.

EFFECT OF ADDITIONAL AVENUES OF APPROPRIATION WITHIN
AN OPTIMAL CONTRACTING FRAMEWORK

Whether or not market discipline is affected by avenues of slack, all recognize
that there is slack in market discipline. This Part examines the effect of additional
avenues of appropriation on a manager’s overall share of firm value under an optimal
contracting framework, assuming that this mechanism actually limits managerial
appropriation. The optimal contracting model assumes that the principal (here the
shareholders or the board of directors) minimizes agency costs and maximizes
shareholder value by minimizing the sum of the costs of contracting, monitoring,
bonding, and residual loss. The optimal contracting model predicts that the manager’s
share of firm value generally increases with the creation or deregulation of opaque
avenues of appropriation that are largely under the control of the executives themselves,
e.g., insider trading, self-dealing, or the taking of corporate opportunities. Avenues of
appropriation that can be eliminated by directorial fiat should have little or no affect on
total appropriation under this model.
A. The Optimal Contracting Model of Managerial Compensation
This article follows Jensen and Meckling’s optimal contracting theory of
managerial agency costs in analyzing the impact of additional avenues of managerial
appropriation.69 The analysis begins with a sole proprietor-manager who sells shares of
equity to non-managing outsiders, which creates a wedge between the manager’s private
incentives and the incentives of the shareholders generally.70 The outside shareholders
69
70
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cannot perfectly (or costlessly) observe the manager’s effort or focus, and performance
results are not completely within the manager’s control.71 Thus, the shareholders cannot
ensure perfect fidelity to their objectives, and the manager, who now owns less than
100% of the cash flow rights, will tend to consume excessive perks, loaf and otherwise
extract private benefits, since he enjoys 100% of the benefit of such activities, but only a
fraction of the cost, which is borne pro rata by all shareholders.
Agency costs under this model are defined as the sum of 1) monitoring costs
incurred by the principal, 2) bonding costs incurred by the manager-agent to better ensure
loyalty to shareholder wealth maximization, and 3) the cost of the residual divergence
between the manager’s actual decisions and shareholder wealth-maximizing decisions.72
The costs involved in designing and negotiating the manager’s contract should be added
to this list as well. The optimal contract would minimize the sum of these agency costs.
Jensen and Meckling assumed that increases in monitoring reduce the residual loss, but
do so at a decreasing rate, in other words, incremental investment in monitoring produces
diminishing returns.73 Under this assumption, we would expect some divergence of goals
and some residual loss under the optimal contract.74
More specifically, contracting and monitoring costs include all agency costs
incurred directly by the principal. These include the costs of writing compensation
contracts and other rules and procedures to limit an executive’s access to private benefits;
the costs of monitoring and enforcing such rules, contracts, and procedures, such as
audits; and, importantly, the cost of incentive compensation, which, under this model, is
just another tool for minimizing total agency costs. Residual loss or slack represents the
divergence between the manager’s actions and shareholder wealth-maximizing actions.
The residual loss could be comprised of management shirking,75 pursuing only low risk
opportunities,76 taking excessive perquisites, making corporate contributions to pet
charities, or otherwise extracting private benefits through insider trading, self-dealing,
taking corporate opportunities, etc.
It is worth emphasizing that the agency costs in this model also result from a lack
of transparency. If the shareholders could perfectly and costlessly observe the manager’s
effort and the impact of the manager on performance results, there would be no agency
costs. With perfect transparency, a contract could be designed that would ensure
managerial fidelity to shareholder objectives. Essentially, the manager would be paid or
71
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retained if he took shareholder regarding actions; otherwise he would not be.77 As a
result, the manager would take shareholder regarding actions. In the real world, however,
actions and results are never this transparent.78
B. Optimal Compensation Exceeds Lower Bound on the Manager’s Share
The floor on the manager’s share is set by the amount required to attract and
retain the manager – his reservation wage. This amount is determined by the manager’s
other opportunities. But this amount should not be thought of as optimal compensation.
A firm may wish to pay its manager more than this minimum in order to create incentives
to increase firm value.79 An example may help clarify this point. Imagine an idealized
firm owned and managed by a single individual (“M”) who maximizes his own utility.
Suppose firm value in this situation is 100. Now imagine that M sells 99% of the equity
to an outside shareholder (“SH”). Suppose SH agrees to pay M his reservation wage, a
fixed amount of compensation with present value equal to 10. SH monitors M’s
performance through quarterly board meetings and audits, at a cost of 5, but cannot
perfectly observe M’s level of effort or the advisability of M’s management decisions. M
may worry about retaining his position, but clearly his incentive to maximize firm value
is reduced. For every dollar of firm value he adds/squanders, he enjoys/suffers only one
cent. Meanwhile his compensation is fixed. Thus, loafing and perk consumption (of
which he enjoys 100%) will increase at the expense of firm value.80 Suppose the value of
the company in this scenario falls to 50, implying a residual loss of 50 (100 – 50) and
total agency costs of 65, including monitoring costs and M’s compensation. SH enjoys
net value of 35; M receives 10.81
Now imagine that the parties negotiate an incentive compensation contract under
which M and SH divide firm value in excess of 50.82 M now has a much stronger
incentive to maximize shareholder value and reduce perks and loafing. Essentially, the
cost of perks and loafing rises from one cent on the dollar to fifty cents on the dollar, so
perk consumption and loafing will be reduced. Because M does not bear 100% of the
costs of perk consumption and loafing, however, he will not work as hard and will
consume more perks than he did in the sole proprietor case. Suppose that firm value in
77

See Posner, supra note x, at 227.
Managerial risk aversion plays a role in the creation of agency costs as well. See id.
79
See James A. Mirrlees, The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an
Organization, 7 Bell J. Econ. 105, 108 (1976).
80
As Jensen and Meckling point out, agency costs are borne by the owner/manager when he sells
shares to third parties. Thus, M has the incentive in this case to minimize agency costs. See Jensen &
Meckling, supra note x, at 313. This does not mean, however, that M will not maximize his private
benefits once the shares are sold.
81
To simplify the numbers, I ignore M’s 1% of residual firm value here and throughout.
82
The ideal incentive for an agent is one that directly encourages him to maximize the principal’s
objective function, here firm value. Holmstrom and Milgrom have shown that where agents have multiple
tasks, high-powered incentives related to one task can be counterproductive if the other tasks are difficult to
monitor. Tying a manager’s compensation to share value should solve this problem, however, as long as
markets are reasonably efficient and managers cannot game share value. See Bengt Holmstrom & Paul
Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7
J.L. Econ. & Org. 24 (1991).
78
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this scenario is 80. Although M’s compensation increases to 25, total agency costs are
reduced to 50 because of the large reduction in residual loss. Thus, SH enjoys net value
of 50.83 Note also that while M’s compensation has increased from 10 to 25 under the
incentive compensation scheme, the increase in his utility is less since he has cut back on
perks and loafing.84
C. Upper Bound on Manager’s Share
How do we reconcile the optimal contracting model with the market forces
limitations on appropriation discussed in Part II? After all, both approaches are very
much within the law and economics framework. Although not generally portrayed in this
fashion, it may be helpful to think of the market forces discussed in Part II as overriding
external limitations and optimal contracting as a contingent internal limitation on
managerial appropriation. For example, if a company were to invest too little in
monitoring, it might suffer such a large residual loss as to trigger a takeover. If, on the
other hand, the directors were to invest in monitoring well beyond the efficient level, this
spending might represent excessive agency costs that could be eliminated via takeover.
In between, however, there may be a range of solutions – levels of contracting and
monitoring and resulting residual loss – that hold total agency costs below the external
market forces cap. A shareholder-regarding board of directors would select the solution
that minimizes total agency costs within this subset of options. Of course, this optimal
contract could be viewed as the result of market forces. If the manager refuses to accept
this contract, he can be replaced, assuming the contract provides at least the reservation
wage. However, external market forces do not dictate this result. If the board is
captured, derelict, or just ill-advised, agency costs could exceed the minimal level
without triggering a takeover or invoking another external market limitation.85
D. Effect of an Additional Channel of Appropriation on the Optimal Contract
As suggested, the optimal contract generally will contain an incentive
compensation element and result in the optimal manager’s share exceeding his
reservation wage. The manager’s share will be capped by market forces, but the
83

SH net value is calculated as follows: 80 (firm value) – 5 (direct monitoring) – 10 (salary) – 15
(incentive compensation). I again ignore M’s 1% shareholding for simplicity.
84
Although the optimal compensation package offered to a risk neutral manager might consist
solely of incentive compensation, such a package is unlikely to be ideal for the typical manager. A fixed
salary component serves as insurance for a risk averse or wealth constrained manager. Thus, while we
might expect that the fixed salary component of an optimal incentive compensation contract to be less than
that of an optimal contract lacking incentive compensation, we would not expect it to be zero in the former
case. See David E. M. Sappington, Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 45, 63
(1991) (noting that fixed salary serves as insurance against market influences on the firm’s stock price that
are outside the manager’s control); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Christine Jolls, Managerial Value Diversion
and Shareholder Wealth, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 487 (providing a model of managerial value diversion in
which shareholders provide managers with the minimum amount of fixed salary compatible with their
wealth constraints).
85
See Appendix Figure 2 for a graphical representation of optimal contracting against an
overriding external market forces limitation.
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shareholders will seek to minimize agency costs below this level. Thus far, I have
analyzed a case in which the manager has no access to any avenue of pecuniary value
appropriation except for direct compensation. I will now relax that constraint and
investigate the impact of additional avenues of appropriation under the optimal
contracting framework.
Suppose that M initially has no opportunity to engage in lucrative self-dealing
with his firm. Perhaps all transactions between companies and managers are prohibited
by mandatory corporate law and monitoring is costless. Suppose the optimal contract is
the incentive contract described above.
Now suppose that the prohibition on self-dealing is lifted and an overall fairness
test is applied to judge whether a transaction between a firm and its manager represents a
breach of fiduciary duty.86 Suppose also that SH is incapable of detecting and preventing
all such transactions without incurring exorbitant monitoring expenses. M now has a new
avenue of appropriating private benefits. Because he enjoys 100% of such benefits and
bears only a fraction of their cost through his incentive compensation arrangement and
small ownership share of the firm, we can expect him to extract private benefits through
self-dealing, increasing his overall appropriation and the agency costs faced by
shareholders.
Assume for now that self-dealing represents a pure value transfer from SH to M
and has no other effect on shareholder value. Imagine that M extracts private benefits of
20 through self-dealing, which reduces firm value from 80 to 60. M bears half of the cost
of reduced firm value, receiving incentive compensation of only 5, but his total share of
firm value increases to 35. Agency costs increase to 60, comprised of M’s compensation
of 15, direct monitoring of 5, and residual loss of 40. Thus, SH enjoys only 40 after
agency costs.87
Shareholders, however, need not accept this result. If SH could perfectly and
costlessly observe the level of M’s self-dealing or even estimate it accurately, SH could
simply reduce M’s compensation by 10 and restore the status quo. But monitoring is
costly and, although SH suspects self-dealing, the reduction in firm value from 80 to 60
could be the result of poor market conditions or bad luck. Thus, restoration of the status
quo is infeasible.
Nonetheless, direct monitoring can be increased and the terms of the incentive
compensation arrangement can be revised to minimize agency costs in this new
contracting environment. First, the shareholders can increase direct monitoring, which
discourages M from engaging in particularly egregious self-dealing behavior. Second,
although it may seem paradoxical at first, the shareholders may be better off increasing
M’s compensation in order to better align incentives. Suppose SH adopts both
86

Under current law, self-dealing transactions are permitted if they can satisfy a judicial test of
fairness or, in some states, if the transaction is properly approved by independent directors or shareholders.
See Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 160 (1986).
87
Again, this calculation ignores M’s 1% share.
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approaches, increasing direct monitoring from 5 to 8 and increasing M’s share of firm
value in excess of 50 from 50% to 60%. Suppose as a result M reduces diversion through
self-dealing to 5, resulting in firm value of 75. M’s incentive compensation in this
scenario is 15 (60% of 25), his salary remains 10, monitoring is 8, and residual loss is 25,
for total agency costs of 58. Shareholders are better off by 2 with this revised contract,
and M is worse off by 5.
Two aspects of the new optimal contract warrant further remark. First, optimality
is viewed from the shareholders’ perspective. In a sense the new optimal contract is less
efficient than the former one: More is being spent on direct monitoring, which reduces
the combined surplus of M and SH. But the idea to the optimal contract is to minimize
shareholder agency costs.88 If we wanted to maximize combined shareholder and
manager surplus, we would eliminate direct monitoring and allow M to appropriate the
entire pie. Second, one may ask why M would give up private benefits of self-dealing, of
which he enjoys 100% under my assumptions, for 60% of incremental firm value. Of
course, he wouldn’t if that were all that was going on, but if direct monitoring is
increased in conjunction with adoption of higher powered incentives, the combination
could have that result.89 The primary point is that both increased direct monitoring and
higher powered incentives have the effect of raising M’s cost of appropriating private
benefits. The shareholders could use either lever or both to minimize agency costs in a
given contracting environment.
Comparison of the hypothetical optimal contracts reached in environments with
and without self-dealing reveals two sources of added managerial value appropriation.
First, it is possible that shareholders may wish to increase incentive compensation in
order to discourage managers from extracting private benefits. Second, given the
assumption of diminishing returns from monitoring, it is unlikely that it will be optimal
for shareholders to completely eliminate an avenue of appropriation of private benefits.
More likely, as in the example above, some extraction of private benefits will continue
under the optimal contract.90
In the example discussed above, I have assumed that the “new” avenue of
managerial appropriation represents a simple value transfer from shareholders to the
88

See Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note x, at 89. But see Eric Talley, Turning Servile
Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 Yale L.J. 277
(1998) (noting two common approaches to optimality in the corporate governance literature, one of which
focuses on shareholder wealth maximization and the other on joint wealth maximization.) For the reason
discussed in the text, I believe the former approach is more appropriate in this context. Note, however, that
maximizing shareholder value actually benefits the manager in this scenario because the price at which the
manager can sell the equity of the firm depends on the ability of the shareholders to minimize agency costs.
89
To see this, suppose that the increase in direct monitoring increases the likelihood that M is
caught in an unfair self-dealing transaction and is fired. M must weigh the benefit of self-dealing, the risk
of apprehension, and the cost of self-dealing in terms of reduced incentive compensation.
90
The latter point is demonstrated graphically in Appendix Figure 3. For any given level of
contracting and monitoring, residual loss and total agency costs in the environment permitting additional
extraction of private benefits exceed those experienced in the environment with limited opportunities.
Although minimized within the contracting environment, optimized agency costs are greater in the second
environment than the first.
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manager and has no efficiency effects, but this will not necessarily be the case. Transfers
can have positive or negative efficiency effects.91 A corporate opportunity, for example,
might be more valuable in the hands of the manager than in corporate solution.92 This
type of positive efficiency effect clearly offsets part of the agency costs resulting from the
additional avenue of slack. Similarly, access to an avenue of appropriation may in itself
create incentives to increase firm value.93 On the other hand, appropriation channels can
create dis-benefits. A corporate opportunity may be valuable to a manager, but more
valuable to the corporation. Even if a self-dealing transaction represents a pure value
transfer, time spent by the manager in finding and negotiating the transaction could be
better spent in improving the business. As before, I generally will assume in this analysis
that avenues of appropriation represent pure value transfers, but it is important to bear in
mind that this may not be the case. In the next section, I will consider a closely related
issue, which is how the intensity of private benefits affects the difficulty of deterring a
manager from appropriating private benefits.
E. Factors Affecting the Magnitude of Managerial Appropriation under the Optimal
Contracting Model
I have argued that additional avenues of value appropriation increase the
manager’s share of firm value under the optimal contracting model because of shifts in
the optimal contract in favor of additional incentive compensation and increased residual
slack. This section analyses factors that affect the magnitude of these effects. Intuition
suggests that the important factors include the relative difficulty of direct monitoring, the
intensity of private benefits, and the ability of the directors to unilaterally eliminate a
potential channel of appropriation.
1. Difficulty of Direct Monitoring
If an avenue of managerial appropriation can be directly monitored, perfectly and
costlessly, it should not result in any incremental appropriation. To begin with a trivial,
but hopefully instructive example, imagine that a bank manager is given access to the
vault to assist clients but that his contract expressly prohibits removal of funds for any
other purpose. Assuming that the vault is equipped with effective surveillance equipment
and that the guards are instructed to stop anyone except clients from leaving the building
with cash from the vault, this potential avenue of appropriation should not increase the
manager’s share. He cannot get away with embezzling funds and will not try. Even if
the bank manager were to get past the guards, his employer could simply reduce his other
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See Bebchuk & Jolls, supra note x, at 496-501.
See id.
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See id. For example, it has been argued that insider trading may facilitate the flow of accurate
and timely information about firm value to the markets and may serve as an efficient compensation device
for entrepreneurial activity within a company. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock
Market (1966); Carlton & Fischel, supra note x at 866-72.
92
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compensation by the amount of the embezzled funds, again eliminating the impact of this
avenue of appropriation on the manager’s share.94
More generally, the more transparent the transaction, the easier the direct
monitoring, and the less the incremental appropriation. Thus, cash transactions with the
company and bonuses based on discrete events should prove less problematic for
shareholders under the optimal contracting model than complex, long term arrangements
and non-cash transfers. Take the example of cash deal bonuses that are commonly paid
to CEOs for completing mergers or acquisitions.95 These transactions should be
relatively transparent and easy to monitor directly. It will be clear whether Acme has
acquired Beta according to plan (although it may not be clear whether the price paid was
advantageous). The payment amount is in cash and is costless to value.
At the other end of the spectrum consider self-dealing. Suppose Acme purchases
widgets from Beta, in which Acme’s CEO has an interest. The transfer of value to
Acme’s CEO may be difficult to monitor for several reasons. First, Acme’s CEO’s
interest may or may not be disclosed. Perhaps it is indirect. Beta may be owned by a
friend or relative. Second, even if Beta is wholly owned by Acme’s CEO and the
relationship is disclosed, the extent of the transfer is unclear unless the market for
widgets is very transparent itself. If not, it may be difficult to determine whether the selfdealing transaction represents a fair, market exchange or entails a transfer of value to
Acme’s CEO.96 Insider trading presents similar difficulties. Because managers can
trade anonymously, insider trading is difficult to detect if managers fail to report their
transactions, and even if all trades are disclosed, it may not be obvious whether a
manager has exploited inside information to generate excess profits.97
Transactions that provide psychic or other non-cash benefits present particular
monitoring challenges. Consider corporate charitable giving. Suppose Acme makes a
large contribution to the alma mater of its CEO or the hospital that recently hosted his
quadruple bypass operation. Clearly, there is a transfer of value to the CEO, but how
much value? The foregoing examples – self-dealing, insider trading, and contributions
directed to pet charities – demonstrate in different ways the two general categories of
monitoring difficulty – spotting the transfer and valuing the transfer.
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As suggested supra note x, depending on the composition of the bank manager’s pay package,
this reduction in other compensation may or may not affect the bank manager’s incentives and shareholder
wealth.
95
See infra Part V for further discussion and empirical evidence related to deal bonuses.
96
Theoretically, of course, the transfer of value could run in either direction. Managerial value
appropriation occurs when the CEO of Acme, who bears less than 100% of residual gains and losses,
transfers value to his wholly owned company Beta through a self-dealing transaction. Managerial self
interest virtually ensures that value will not be transferred in the other direction.
97
At bottom, this is an information asymmetry problem. When transactions are non-transparent
and the manager has superior information regarding the participants and profit potential of trade, agency
costs will increase and permit greater managerial appropriation. Cf. Talley, supra note x, at 310-36
(analyzing the corporate opportunity doctrine under the assumption that the manager has private and
unverifiable information regarding the degree to which an opportunity fits the corporate scheme and that
the manager has the incentive to misrepresent the fit).
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2. Intensity of Private Benefits
Under the optimal contracting model, it should be relatively easy to deter value
appropriation through channels that offer only weak private benefits and difficult to deter
appropriation when private benefits are intense. Consider supplemental executive
retirement programs (“SERPS”). SERPS are designed to supplement pensions for
executives whose participation in qualified retirement plans is capped under federal
law.98 SERPS are essentially direct transfers from companies to executives. A dollar
spent on a CEO’s SERP is a dollar in his pocket. Of course, if a dollar spent on a CEO’s
SERP means that two dollars are spent on the SERPs of his lieutenants, the intensity of
the private benefit is diminished, but take the extreme case in which only the CEO is
offered a SERP. Because the intensity of private benefits is 100%, it will be impossible
to deter the CEO from increasing the value of his SERP through incentive compensation
alone.99 No incentive compensation program will give an executive 100% of incremental
value and most provide executives with only a tiny fraction of incremental value. Thus,
shareholder would have to rely on direct monitoring to control appropriation that
provides such intense private benefits.
Compare the deal bonus situation described above. Suppose that only the CEO is
paid a deal bonus so that there is no dilution of private benefits among the troops. Does
this imply that deal bonuses provide high intensity private benefits? Probably, but not
necessarily. Suppose a CEO receives a $1 million bonus for completing a $100 million
acquisition. If the acquisition itself has no effect on firm value, the deal bonus is
analogous to the CEO-only SERP payment – a dollar for dollar transfer from company to
executive. But what if the CEO overpaid for the target company in order to secure his
bonus? Suppose the value of the CEO’s firm falls by $30 million as a result of the
acquisition. A high powered incentive compensation scheme could cause the CEO to
think twice about pursuing such acquisitions.
Now consider corporate charitable giving. Let us assume conservatively that
corporations receive no return on charitable giving, which reduces firm value dollar for
dollar. A CEO may cause his firm to make contributions to a pet charity, but unless his
psychic benefits from doing so constitute a significant portion of the dollar value of the
contribution, a highly powered incentive compensation scheme could deter such
behavior.
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Although the general idea of a SERP is to provide retirement benefits to highly compensated
executives in excess of the limitations on qualified plans provided in the tax code, the contours of
supplemental plans vary widely from firm to firm. SERPs may include defined benefit or defined
contribution plans or some combination of both. Many plans simply mirror the provisions of qualified
plans, such as a traditional defined benefit pension plan, although they lack the tax advantages associated
with a qualified plan. See Janet DenUyl & Matt Leckrone, Perspective: Executive Benefits a Governance
Issue (July 2, 2004), available at
http://www.mercerhr.com/knowledgecenter/reportsummary.jhtml/dynamic/idContent/1145295.
99
See Bebchuk, supra note x, at 1461-67 (discussing the difficulty of controlling managers with
respect to highly redistributive issues).
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More generally, one must consider the intensity of the private benefits enjoyed by
the manager in relation to the total cost to the company of producing those private
benefits. The intensity of private benefits is reduced to the extent that (1) a manager must
share benefits with others, (2) the transfer is not dollar for dollar, or (3) the transfer
causes inefficiencies.100 To take a final example, consider self-dealing. A manager may
be able to shift value from Acme to Beta through self-dealing. If Acme simply overpays
for widgets, the transfer will be dollar for dollar from Acme to Beta, and the intensity of
the private benefits will depend on the Acme manager’s relationship with Beta. (High if
he is a sole proprietor; low if he is one of many shareholders.) However, if Acme buys
widgets from Beta instead of the more appropriate gizmos from Gamco or reduces
production because of the high cost of Beta’s widgets, there may be efficiency losses as
well as value transfer, which should reduce the intensity of private benefits.
3. Ability of Directors to “Just Say No”
The optimal contracting model essentially assumes that the principal can observe
results, but not actions. As a result, if the directors have unilateral control over a
potential channel of appropriation, an optimal contract would not include that channel
unless doing so enhanced shareholder value. In other words, if the directors can just say
no to a channel, providing that channel cannot increase managerial appropriation at
shareholder expense under the optimal contracting model.
Suppose a certain perk or benefit (perhaps executive financial planning services)
represents a pure value transfer from shareholders to the manager and has no other effect
on firm value. Under the optimal contracting model, this perk will not be provided unless
the manager pays for it through a reduction in other compensation. If there are tax or
other advantages to the firm purchasing the perk or benefit in lieu of the executive, the
savings may be shared by the parties, but, again, unless the firm is at least made whole
(after tax) for the provision of such benefits, they will not be provided under the optimal
contracting model.101 As I suggested in Part I, if the perk or benefit provides a degree of
risk-free compensation to the manager, the shareholders should share in the combined
surplus to at least this extent.102 The directors, who have unilateral control over the
provision of the perk or benefit under the optimal contracting framework, can make a
take it or leave it offer to the executive, who will accept if he is guaranteed no reduction
100

Here I am referring to inefficiencies that directly reduce firm value. It may also be the case that
managers incur varying levels of private costs in appropriating value through various channels. Obviously,
a manager would consider these costs as well and would tend to gravitate towards low private cost avenues
of appropriation. Cf., Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 Colum. L. Rev.
515 (1985) (making a similar argument with respect to firms with monopoly power gravitating towards low
cost restrictive practices).
101
Some companies do expressly bar certain avenues of value appropriation. For example, Intel’s
most recent proxy statement notes that its executives do not have access to many of the perks that are
common in U.S. public companies. It states: “We do not provide officers with reserved parking spaces or
separate dining facilities, nor do we have programs for providing personal benefit perquisites to officers,
such as permanent lodging or defraying the cost of personal entertainment or family travel.” Reported in
The Corporate Counsel, May-June 2004 at 8. Note that this statement does not rule out all perks, such as
access to company planes and cars.
102
See supra note x and accompanying text.
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in total compensation and in addition enjoys upside opportunity. Thus, under the optimal
contracting model, potential channels of managerial appropriation that are under the
unilateral control of the directors cannot result in incremental appropriation as I narrowly
defined it in Part I.103
These observations extend beyond perks and benefits. Consider the CEO deal
bonuses discussed above. The payoff from acquisitions is, of course, much more
uncertain than the economics of perks and benefits, but unless the expected value of
paying a deal bonus is positive for the firm, directors should just say no, and these
bonuses should not increase managerial appropriation under this model. In the real
world, directors make mistakes and may be misled by executives into pursuing an
acquisition (and paying a deal bonus) that ultimately diminishes shareholder value, but if
we assume, as the optimal contracting model does, that directors are loyal agents of
shareholders who negotiate at arms length, such mistakes should be the exception, not the
norm.
On the other hand, incremental managerial appropriation is possible when the
directors cannot just say no, and the most problematic channels of appropriation under
this model are activities such as self-dealing, taking corporate opportunities, and insider
trading, which are largely within the control of the manager. Even if the directors
contractually restrict or prohibit these activities, they cannot compel compliance.
Appropriation through these channels can be hidden. Assuming that these channels can
be more effectively blocked through legal restrictions than contractual arrangements,
deregulation of these activities should increase total managerial appropriation under the
optimal contracting model.104
Consider insider trading. Trading on the basis of material, non-public information
is prohibited under mandatory legal rules, and penalties for illegal insider trading can
include large fines and even imprisonment.105 The legal prohibition and extra-contractual
103

In the “fixed pie” scenario incremental managerial appropriation was defined to include any
incremental compensation received by the manager as a result of the addition of a new channel of
appropriation, which necessarily comes at shareholder expense. In the pie-enlarging scenario, incremental
appropriation was defined narrowly to reach the failure to downwardly adjust a manager’s other
compensation for the risk-free element of a new channel of appropriation. See id.
104
Lucian Bebchuk and Christine Jolls provide another explanation of why appropriation through
such channels leads to greater overall appropriation. See Bebchuk & Jolls, supra note x. They begin with
the assumption that conventional compensation is optimized to ensure maximum shareholder value given
wealth limitations. Diversion of share value to the managers via these alternative channels generally will
not provide the same value maximizing incentives. Thus, even if shareholders could limit total managerial
appropriation, share value would decline because of reduced incentives. In order to restore share value
maximizing incentives in the face of inefficient value diversion, shareholders would likely sanction an
overall increase in managerial appropriation. This assumes, of course, that the alternative appropriation
channel does not provide some sort of offsetting efficiency benefit for the manager. The authors’ model
reflects this possibility as well. Bebchuk and Jolls’ analysis is correct, but under a strict optimal
contracting framework, their conclusion would hold only if the directors cannot unilaterally prohibit the
alternative appropriation channel.
105
Through the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1986, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress has dramatically increased civil
and criminal penalties for insider trading over the past 20 years. Current potential penalties for the worst
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enforcement mechanisms should reduce the amount of insider trading that takes place,
the expense of direct monitoring, and the extent to which companies are required to offer
incentive compensation to mitigate the private benefits available through insider trading.
Imagine that the federal rules prohibiting insider trading were simply repealed,
and suppose that insider trading generally is not an efficient form of managerial
appropriation. Companies might decide to prohibit the practice contractually. It is
unlikely, however, that companies could impose contractual penalties that would provide
the level of deterrence created under current federal law. Companies also would lack the
detection and enforcement tools available to the federal government.106 As a result, all
else being equal, managerial appropriation of private benefits via insider trading would
rise. As before, the optimal contracting framework suggests that companies would
reoptimize in this new environment by increasing direct monitoring, increasing incentive
compensation, or through a combination of these and other measures. Nonetheless,
residual slack and value appropriation would increase under this model if the federal
restrictions were lifted.
Other companies might decide that insider trading can offer benefits to the firm in
certain situations and might attempt to regulate the practice contractually rather than
prohibit it. A company that wished to regulate insider trading without prohibiting it
would need to promulgate rules defining who may trade on inside information, how, and
when; develop procedures for auditing trades of employees for compliance with such
procedures; and specify penalties for noncompliance. This process will be more difficult
and costly to monitor than simple prohibition.107 Under the optimal contracting model,
however, we assume that the directors would choose the level of private regulation that
maximizes shareholder value, so increases in monitoring cost and residual slack would be
accepted only if these were offset by efficiency gains. In other words, a decision to
permit but regulate insider trading could not result in share value decreasing
appropriation under this model.
If instead of wholesale deregulation of insider trading, Congress were to permit
companies to opt out of or into the federal regulatory system, this shift would have little
effect on incremental appropriation under the optimal contracting model. Presumably,
companies would opt out of a more effective public regulatory environment only if the
benefits exceeded the costs.108 Even optional deregulation could have some adverse
offenders include treble damages in civil prosecutions and fines of up to $5 million and imprisonment for
up to 20 years in criminal prosecutions. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 21A(a)(2)(civil penalties)
and 32(a)(criminal penalties).
106
Conceivably a market for monitoring insider trading could develop in the absence of a legal
prohibition, and privatized monitoring could be more efficient than governmental monitoring. Even if that
were the case, however, private monitors would lack important monitoring tools, such a subpoena power,
that are available to the government and certainly would lack the ability to impose criminal penalties on
violators.
107
See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note x, at 38 (assuming that is easier for the principal to
exclude an activity than to restrict and monitor that activity)
108
There is an extensive literature grounded in the optimal contracting model that argues for the
replacement of mandatory corporate law with a system permitting firms to opt into or out of corporate law
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impact, however, if reduced participation in the federal system undermined its
effectiveness.
Except for insider trading, the avenues of value appropriation discussed in this
article are permitted by law, and there are no opportunities to opt into legal prohibitions.
Companies may prohibit or regulate these practices as they see fit. Formerly self-dealing
was prohibited by mandatory corporate law.109 But the law has evolved in favor of a
more lenient fairness test. This analysis suggests that such a move may have been costly
for shareholders, but of course the benefits may have outweighed the costs.110 Generally,
however, self-dealing, taking corporate opportunities, and insider trading pose the most
significant threats of increasing agency costs and managerial appropriation under the
optimal contracting model because the directors cannot just say no.111
IV.

EFFECT OF ADDITIONAL AVENUES OF APPROPRIATION UNDER
THE MANAGERIAL POWER MODEL

The previous part analyzed stylized contractual arrangements between a manager
and a homogeneous group of shareholders. There are at least two problems with this
model. First, shareholders and their goals are not homogeneous.112 Second, shareholders
do not negotiate directly with management; they act through the company’s board of
directors. As a result, the agency problems in the modern publicly traded corporation are
actually much more daunting than those described in the optimal contracting model. The
managerial power model of corporate governance attempts to reflect the reality of this
situation – the limited power of shareholders, the incentives and behavioral forces faced
by the board, and the power of management resulting from informational and positional
advantages – and describe the effect on managerial appropriation.113 This part will apply
the managerial power model to the specific questions whether and how additional
avenues of value appropriation contribute to the manager’s overall share of firm value.
A. Description of the Managerial Power Model

rules. For an overview of that literature and criticism thereof see the November 1989 symposium issue of
the Columbia Law Review.
109
See Clark, supra note x, at 160.
110
It is conceivable that the cost associated with the over-inclusiveness of a blanket prohibition
against managerial self-dealing exceeded the agency costs associated with deregulation. The foregoing
analysis suggests, however, that an opt in or opt out approach might have been superior.
111
One may be tempted to think that executive compensation falls into this category as well. After
all, managers must be paid. Does this mean that compensation arrangements are fertile sources of
incremental managerial appropriation? No, not under the optimal contracting model. Managers can be
paid in cash. Under this model, firms would elect to pay managers by other means only if doing so
increased shareholder value. As in the case of deal bonuses, stock options, restricted stock, and other
compensation arrangements cannot increase managerial appropriation to the shareholders’ detriment under
this model.
112
I am not very concerned about the shareholder heterogeneity issue. In large, public companies,
shareholders generally want to maximize share value and can select their portfolios to achieve the desired
level of risk. See Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note x, at 87.
113
See generally Bebchuk et al, supra note x.
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The managerial power model suggests that we should not expect public
companies to reach optimal contracts with managers.114 The reasoning, in brief, is as
follows: Boards are imperfect agents of shareholders. Although well paid, directors
generally have relatively weak financial incentives to maximize firm value.115 The
incentive to retain a board position generally outweighs the incentive to maximize
shareholder value.116 As a result outside directors are encouraged to acquiesce to
executives who have the power to hire and fire them.117 In addition, a number of
psychological forces at play in the boardroom tend to foster an attitude of deference to
the CEO.118
What does this model have to say about executive compensation and managerial
value appropriation generally? First, as with the optimal contracting model, this model
recognizes that market forces place an upper bound on value appropriation.119 Despite
imperfect contracting, however, this model does not suggest that management necessarily
will be able to appropriate firm value up to the market forces bound. The model posits
that directors are subject to an outrage constraint. Although directors have a strong
incentive to please management, they also have a public reputation to maintain. Most
outside directors of large public companies are CEOs in their own right or other noted
professionals. As such, they will tend to resist compensation policies or practices that
bring disrepute. Of course, all of this is relative. Compensation practices of major
companies are judged by the practices of their peers.120
As a result, the managerial power model suggests the critical importance of
transparency and salience of compensation or other value appropriation. If all channels
of appropriation were perfectly transparent and equally salient, channels would be
irrelevant under this model. Outrage would be a function only of total appropriation. But
appropriation is not transparent, and managers may be able to increase their share by
114

However, the managerial power model should be seen as complementing the optimal
contracting model, not as a mutually exclusive view of corporate governance. Proponents of a managerial
power view would not deny that agency costs and incentives play some role in setting managerial
compensation. Perhaps the managerial power view should be termed the (sub)optimal contracting view.
See Bebchuk et al, supra note x, at 755.
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See id. at 769-70
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See id. at 770-71.
117
Corporate executives obviously cannot hire and fire outside directors in the traditional sense of
the terms, but they have considerable power over the director nomination process, which in most cases is
tantamount to a director appointment process. See id. at 766-67.
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Traditionally outside directors have been expected to support their CEO unless and until
circumstances arise in which it becomes necessary to replace him. See Brian E. G. Main, et al, The CEO,
the Board of Directors, and Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 11 Indus.
& Corp. Change 293, 304 (1995). The social dynamics within the board room are marked by norms of
reciprocity and deference to authority. Outside directors, for example, tend to reciprocate for their
appointments by deferring to and supporting the CEO. See id. at 304.
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See Bebchuk et al, supra note x, at 787.
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See id. at 789-91. In addition, corporate directors are increasingly subject to standards of
corporate governance imposed by Congress under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and by the stock
exchanges, including standards of independence and diligence. Directors serving on audit and
compensation committees are affected particularly. These directives ultimately may complement and even
reinforce the outrage constraint. [Cite NYSE & NASDAQ websites and SOX.]
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camouflaging compensation and avoiding outrage.121 They will tend to follow the herd
and avoid significant deviations from industry pay practices, but they will take advantage
of low salience means of extracting additional value.
B. Avenues of Value Appropriation Under the Managerial Power Model
The number and types of channels of value appropriation available clearly affect
the manager’s overall share of firm value under the managerial power model. Cash
salary, the compensation paradigm, is the most transparent and salient form of
compensation available. Thus, dividing compensation between salary, bonuses, perks,
golden parachutes, and the like tends to reduce salience and outrage and permit greater
overall appropriation. This can be thought of as a “divide and prosper” strategy. In
addition, certain channels of value appropriation provide greater camouflage than others.
In some cases it may be difficult to discern the value transfer or the extent of the transfer.
In others, the transfer may be transparent, but a plausible justification exists for adding
this transfer to the manager’s existing share. The more opaque and/or plausibly
justifiable the transfer, the less the outrage, and the greater the value appropriation via
that channel.
1. Opaque Value Transfer
In the previous Part, I argued that monitoring difficulty – challenges in identifying
or valuing transfers to managers – is a key factor in determining the extent to which an
added avenue of appropriation will increase a manager’s share of firm value under the
optimal contracting model. Opacity is a similar concept within the managerial power
framework, and generally lack of transparency has similar effects under the two models,
but there is an important difference that follows from the differing mechanisms. Under
the optimal contracting model, the opportunity for incremental value transfer arises
because the principal has difficulty spotting or valuing the transfer, but we assume that it
is in the principal’s interest to find and evaluate these transfers in order to minimize
agency costs. Under the managerial power model, the issue is opacity of transfers to the
financial analysts and institutional investors who provide the outrage that limits
appropriation.122 Under this model, both managers and directors have an interest in
camouflaging compensation. As a result, the factors that make it difficult to monitor
transfers also tend to make them opaque to corporate critics, but opacity also can arise
from deliberate obfuscation.
Insider trading, self-dealing, and directing corporate contributions to pet charities
can each provide for opaque value transfer to managers for the reasons discussed in Part
III – the transfers can be difficult to spot (insider trading and perhaps self-dealing) and
even if spotted difficult to value, particularly if non-cash benefits are involved (selfdealing and directed contributions). But even when the manager is clearly the sole
beneficiary of a cash-only arrangement, the value transfer may remain opaque.
Supplemental executive retirement programs, which are discussed above, provide an
121
122

See Bebchuk et al, supra note x, at 789.
See id. at 787.
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instructive example. SERPs are extraordinarily complex, and the expected payoffs are
far from transparent. A leading executive compensation expert has written that “[f]rom
proxy disclosures, even sophisticated compensation consultants have been unable to
figure out exactly how much the [company executives] will actually receive under a
company’s SERP.”123 If value transfer by way of SERPs is opaque to compensation
experts, it seems likely that these will serve as a low outrage means of increasing the
manager’s share.124
Note that SERPs do not necessarily present a monitoring problem under the
optimal contracting framework. The fact that SERPs are difficult to value based on the
information contained in required proxy disclosures does not mean that the principal
would have difficulty determining the expected value of these commitments, although
surely this is somewhat more difficult and costly than evaluating salary payments.
I also argued in Part II that external market forces limitations on managerial
appropriation are undermined by the introduction of opaque channels of appropriation.
The effect of opacity under these two models is similar, but not necessarily identical.
One might imagine, for example, that it is harder to hide appropriation from corporate
raiders, who have a strong profit incentive for ferreting out such information, than from
the financial press and other less interested observers, in which case opacity could have a
larger impact on total managerial appropriation under the managerial power model than
the external market forces limitation model.
2. Plausible Justifications for Additional Transfers
Certain value transfers to managers are perfectly transparent but nonetheless may
produce less outrage than equivalent salary payments because a plausible justification
exists for the specific incremental transfer. Deal bonuses are a prime example. As noted,
many firms provide executives with one-time bonuses for completing the acquisition of a
target company or for similar specific transactions.125 The skeptic may ask why a CEO
receives salary and options if not to pursue value-added acquisitions, but a plausible story
can be told that a specific deal bonus opportunity is justified in order to focus an
executive’s attention on an acquisition. This is similar to the logic used to justify
incentive compensation generally, but applied to a specific project.
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See The Corporate Counsel, supra note x at 6. See also DenUyl & Leckrone, supra note x
(providing an example in which the lump sum value of a SERP for a 57 year old CEO retiring after 20
years of service and earning $1 million base salary and $1 million annual incentives immediately before
retirement could range from $9.5 million to $68.3 million depending on changes in assumptions concerning
adjustments to reflect commencement of benefits prior to normal retirement age, payment over the joint
lives of the CEO and spouse, credits for years of service prior to joining the company, inclusion of longterm incentive compensation in pensionable earnings, and discount rates.
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Transparency is further undermined by the fact that SERP payouts occur after an executive’s
retirement and thus are not reported in the annually published tables that are the most visible marker of
executive compensation. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note x, at 99.
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See supra note x and accompanying text.
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In fact, equity compensation can be viewed in the same light. Although equity
programs also can be complex and certainly are much less transparent than cash
compensation, the primary outrage deflector, I think, is the argument that stock and
options provide incentives that cause managers to grow the pie. And of course, there is
more than a grain of truth to this. Equity compensation does provide incentives that are
valuable to shareholders. The appropriate questions are: How much stock? How many
options? At what price? In what fashion? However, once outrage is deflected through
the plausible justification of incentive alignment, it is easier for executives to extract
value through these programs.
While plausible justification reduces outrage under the managerial power model,
it should have no effect under the optimal contracting model. As discussed in Part III, the
optimal contracting model assumes that the principal cannot be fooled into providing the
manager with additional compensation at the expense of shareholders.
3. Both Opaque and Plausibly Justified
Of course many avenues of value appropriation exhibit both properties – the
transfer is opaque and plausibly justified as a valuable addition to the compensation
smorgasbord. SERPs and stock options certainly have elements of both. In addition to
being complex, SERPs can be plausibly justified on fairness or efficiency grounds as
follows: Despite the tax code limitations, executives require pensions proportional to
their salary just like rank and file employees if they are to maintain their standard of
living in retirement.126 In addition to being plausibly justifiable on incentive grounds,
option values obviously are less transparent than cash. Despite the widespread adoption
of the Black-Scholes option pricing model to traded options, experts continue to debate
the accuracy of that model in the context of compensatory options.127
Several other common avenues of value appropriation fall into this category as
well. Management perks generally can be plausibly justified on efficiency grounds.
Executive time is extremely valuable, and company cars and planes free up time for busy
executives. Country club memberships and company apartments provide quiet venues
for entertaining company clients. But executives receive personal enjoyment and psychic
benefits from these perks and the status they signal. Valuing these personal benefits is
difficult, and the challenge for outside analysts is compounded when companies obscure
the cost of these perks. For example, companies are required by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to disclose the value of perks provided to certain senior
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SERPS, however, may be a tax inefficient means of providing executive retirement benefits if
the choice is between an executive investing after-tax dollars at favorable capital gains rates and the
company making the same investments but paying the higher corporate tax rate. See Bebchuk & Fried,
supra note x, at 97-98. On the other hand, SERPS may be tax efficient if the employing company has large
losses and is effectively tax exempt. Cf. David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84
B.U. L. Rev. 695, 737-38 (making the same argument with respect to equity compensation).
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See, e.g., Lingling Wei, What’s the Cost of a Stock Option?, Wall St. J., March 4, 2004, at C3;
Zvi Bodie et al, For the Last Time: Stock Options are an Expense, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar. 2003, at 63, 6568.
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executives if such value exceeds $50,000.128 Suppose a company spends $100,000 for a
limo for the CEO and hires a driver. One would think that this perk must be disclosed,
but by making the car and driver “available” to other executives, the company can treat
only the CEO’s personal use as a perk and thus avoid disclosure.129
Golden parachute contracts provide another example. A golden parachute
provides an executive of an acquired company a comfortable financial landing if she is
displaced as a result of the acquisition.130 The incentive rational is straightforward.
Management positions are valuable to incumbents. All else being equal managers will
fight to retain position even if that means foregoing an opportunity for the company to be
acquired at a premium to share price. Because managers have a great deal of discretion
to combat takeovers under corporate law, golden parachutes enhance shareholder value
by encouraging managers to step aside when a potential buyer comes offering a
premium.131 In addition, however, golden parachute contracts are difficult to value.
These contracts typically provide for severance payments, acceleration of option and
retirement program vesting, and various other goodies.132 Recent contracts also require
the company to “gross up” the executive for any taxes that are incurred by the executive
as a result of the payments under section 280G, the anti-golden parachute provision, of
the tax code.133 Thus, even if they can be calculated, the face value of parachute
payments typically understate the expected value transfer to the covered executive in the
event of a takeover and displacement.
C. Other Factors Affecting Managerial Appropriation under the Managerial Power
Model
In the previous part of this article, I argued that under the optimal contracting
model the impact of an avenue of value appropriation on the manager’s share would
depend on the difficulty of direct monitoring, the intensity of private benefits, and the
ability of the directors to just say no. The first two factors also play a role under the
managerial power model. I have already noted the similarity between the monitoring
difficulty problem and the opacity issue under the managerial power framework.
Intensity of private benefits probably plays less of a role under the managerial power
model. On first inspection, a manager might not seem to care about the “efficiency” of
an avenue of value appropriation under this model. Whether the cost to the firm is dollar
for dollar of value transferred or ten dollars per dollar transferred, the manager should
take the opportunity. Efficiency may affect saliency and outrage, however. If a firm
enters into a disastrous string of acquisitions in order to generate deal bonuses for its
CEO, the underlying transactions as well as the bonuses may generate outrage. In
addition, inefficient transfers may introduce market discipline – a takeover or bankruptcy,
128
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for instance. Thus, managers should be somewhat concerned with intensity of private
benefits under the managerial power model, but perhaps to a lesser extent than the
optimal contracting model would predict. Whether a potential channel appropriation is
under the unilateral control of the board, or the managers, or is somewhere in between,
would not appear to have any bearing on incremental appropriation under this model.
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
As we have seen, added avenues of managerial appropriation directionally lead to
greater total managerial appropriation, whether appropriation is capped by external
market forces, an optimal principal/agent contract, or saliency and outrage in accordance
with the managerial power theory. However, certain potential channels of appropriation
that are easily monitored and that are under the unilateral control of the directors should
result in little incremental appropriation under the optimal contracting model, but could
result in significant incremental appropriation under the managerial power or external
market forces models. This Part examines empirical evidence that allows us to test the
theory developed above and the explanatory power of the various models.
In brief, the evidence suggests that additional channels of appropriation lead to
increased total managerial compensation and that incremental managerial compensation
cannot be fully explained by enhanced efficiency. In other words, additional channels of
appropriation lead to increased transfers of wealth from shareholders to managers.
Moreover, the evidence largely is inconsistent with the optimal contracting model.
Channels that should lead to little or no incremental appropriation under this model,
because they are easily monitored and under the unilateral control of directors,
significantly increase total appropriation. This evidence better supports a managerial
power view (and possibly an external market forces view).
A. The Empirical Evidence Indicates that Unconventional Compensation Increases Total
Compensation
Recent evidence indicates that stock options, CEO deal bonuses, and certain perks
do not substitute for other forms of compensation, but represent incremental managerial
compensation. One study does suggest that insider trading profits may substitute for
other compensation, but the weight of this evidence runs counter to the fixed
appropriation view.
1. Stock Options
Stock option compensation for CEOs and other senior corporate executives
increased dramatically in the 1990s. Between 1992 and 1998, the median compensation
of S&P 500 company CEOs increased by 160%.134 This reflected a 335% increase in
option compensation and about a 55% increase in salary and bonus.135 Put another way,
134

See Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment of
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options increased from 19% of the median CEO’s pay package in 1992 to 32% in
1998,136 at which point options had become the single largest component of CEO
compensation.137
It is highly unlikely that the boom in options substituted for other forms of CEO
pay or that, in the absence of options, median CEO compensation would have reached the
same level in 1998. First, median salary and bonus pay continued to rise steadily
throughout this period despite the explosion in options and the 1993 enactment of
section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, which limits the deductibility of nonperformance based executive compensation.138 Second, the rate of increase in total CEO
compensation across the period is much more dramatic than anything experienced before
the invention and widespread adoption of executive stock options.139
This intuition is confirmed by two recent studies that fail to find substitution of
option grants for non-option compensation.140 After adjusting for company performance
and other factors, these studies find that companies that grant more options to senior
managers tend to provide more non-option compensation as well.141 The authors of one
of the studies worry about a potential omitted variable problem – some factor not
observed that would cause a company to want to increase a manager’s overall
compensation through options and other means.142 Nonetheless, these results suggest
little or no substitution of options for other forms of compensation.
136

See id.
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2. Deal Bonuses
In a recent study, Grinstein and Hribar analyzed bonuses paid to CEOs for
completing mergers or acquisitions.143 M&A deal bonuses are fairly common. 39% of
acquiring firms in their sample of 327 large U.S. M&A deals between 1993 and 1998
compensated their CEO for completing the deal.144 The authors found that these bonuses
represent incremental compensation and do not substitute for other forms of pay.145
3. Corporate Aircraft
David Yermack has recently investigated private use of corporate aircraft.146
Yermack found a very small and only marginally significant negative relationship
between personal use of planes and a CEO’s other compensation.147 His regressions
predict that an extra $1000 in perk consumption reduces other compensation by only ten
cents.148 In other words, Yermack’s data suggests essentially no substitution of perks for
other compensation.
4. Insider Trading
Running counter to the foregoing, however, is evidence concerning insider trading
that recently has been compiled by Darren Roulstone. Although trading by insiders on
the basis of material, non-disclosed information is prohibited by law, it is well established
that corporate executives trading in securities of their companies generally outperform
the market by several percentage points.149 Responding to pressure from institutional
investors, regulators, and potential litigation, many companies have acted to curtail
informed trading by limiting insiders to buying and selling within a window of a month
or less following earnings announcements.150 A recent analysis by Roulstone suggests
that firms that restrict trading in this fashion pay their executives 4% to 13% more than
firms that fail to restrict trading, after controlling for other factors.151 This trade off
between insider trading profits and compensation is in line with Easterbrook and
Fischel’s fixed slack argument.
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B. The Empirical Evidence Suggests At Least Some Incremental Appropriation
The fact that stock options, deal bonuses, and perks represent incremental
compensation does not necessarily imply incremental appropriation as I have defined it.
It is conceivable that options, bonuses, and perks result in incentives that lead to
increased shareholder value, and that the division of the gains between managers and
shareholders is fair and efficient. The evidence, however, does not support this benign
explanation. First, deal bonuses do not appear to result in increased shareholder value.
Thus, incremental compensation resulting from deal bonuses clearly represents
incremental appropriation. Second, stock options undoubtedly create share valueenhancing incentives. The absence of any substitution of option compensation for
conventional compensation, however, indicates that at least some share value reducing
appropriation is occurring unless one believes that options are exceptionally risky and
that executives are exceptionally risk averse. It is unclear whether the effect of perk
compensation is more similar to deal bonuses or options, but the conclusion is the same:
Evidence that perks represent almost pure add-on compensation suggests at least some
incremental appropriation.
1. Deal Bonuses
Let us begin with deal bonuses. If an acquisition increased the value of their
shares, shareholders might be happy to incrementally compensate CEOs for completing
the deal. The evidence suggests that M&A deals are not value enhancing for acquiring
firms on average, but some acquisitions are more successful than others, and thus there
still might be an efficiency explanation for deal bonuses. 152 However, Grinstein and
Hribar found that deal performance did not explain the cross-sectional variation in deal
bonuses.153 Deal bonuses do not appear to be driven by efficiency enhancement. If deal
bonuses do not increase the pie, and the evidence suggest that this is the case, the fact that
deal bonuses represent incremental managerial compensation indicates that they result in
managers taking larger slices of the pie, i.e., in incremental managerial appropriation.
2. Stock Options
Unlike deal bonuses, stock options generally are thought to provide incentives
that result in increased firm value.154 Thus, it is difficult to say whether increased total
managerial compensation resulting from the introduction of options represents
appropriation of shareholder wealth or a fair and efficient division of incremental gains
152
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with shareholders. Nonetheless, evidence that option compensation represents purely
incremental compensation suggests that at least some incremental appropriation results.
One would expect total compensation to increase with increased reliance on
options, because an executive pay package that relies strongly on options in lieu of salary
must provide the executive with greater expected value to make up for the higher risk
associated with options.155 However, if option compensation was driven solely by
efficiency considerations, one would expect to observe some substitution of options for
non-option compensation, because stock options provide a degree of low risk
compensation.156 Thus, empirical evidence suggesting zero substitution of options for
other forms of compensation indicates that options result in at least some incremental
appropriation.
To see this, imagine that an executive is initially paid cash salary of 100. Now
imagine that in order to provide share value-enhancing incentives, the directors offer the
executive an “option” with three possible payoffs: 20, if the outcome is “low;” 50, if the
outcome is “average;” or 100, if the outcome is “high.” The executive is certain that the
outcome with be high, average, or low. In this case, even an extremely risk averse
executive should be willing to give up 20 of cash salary in exchange for the option, and
shareholder regarding directors should insist that the manager accept a salary reduction at
least equal to 20. If the option is granted on top of the pre-existing salary of 100, we can
be sure that incremental appropriation is at least 20. Incremental appropriation may be
much larger than 20, but we know that it is at least 20.
Of course, executive stock options do not guarantee a payout, and some options
expire unexercised. However, conventional options come about as close to guaranteeing
a payout as possible. Options are almost always granted at-the-money with a fixed
exercise price and have a ten year life.157 Thus, even if the issuer’s performance lags,
executives can cash in on upswings in the market generally. Moreover, if an issuer’s
stock price falls precipitously, its options often are repriced or replaced to restore the
incentive.158 Thus, even exceptionally risk averse managers should be expected to
sacrifice some salary or other compensation for the receipt of stock options, and the lack
of substitution reported in the empirical literature is evidence of incremental
appropriation resulting from options.159
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3. Perks
It is unclear whether the perk story is more similar to that of deal bonuses or
options, but the conclusion is the same either way: Perks result in at least some
incremental appropriation. As noted above, David Yermack has shown that corporate jet
consumption represents almost purely incremental compensation.160 In my view, it is
very unlikely that the acquisition of corporate jets increases shareholder value. If this is
true, jet use would be analogous to the deal bonus situation described above, and the lack
of substitution of jet consumption by executives for other compensation would represent
incremental appropriation from a fixed pie.
There is some evidence, however, that perks may be efficiency enhancing. In a
study of 300 publicly traded U.S. firms over the years 1986 through 1999, Raghuram
Rajan and Julie Wulf found some support for the view that perks are used to enhance
productivity.161 For example, they found that time-saving perks (such as corporate cars
and planes) were more likely to be used in settings in which the time saved by the perk is
greater (e.g., when company headquarters is more distant from a major airport).162
Assuming, however, that corporate jet use provides risk free consumption value to
executives, we would expect them to forego at least some conventional compensation in
exchange for the jets, even if the perk increases the pie. Yermack’s data suggesting
essentially no substitution indicates that jet use increases appropriation even if Rajan and
Wulf are correct.
C. The Empirical Evidence Generally is Inconsistent with an Optimal Contracting Model
(and Consistent with a Managerial Power Model)
Neither deal bonuses, stock options, nor perks should result in significant
incremental appropriation under an optimal contracting model. Evidence that they do
contribute to an increased manager’s share is more consistent with a managerial power or
even an external market forces view of corporate governance.
1. Deal Bonuses
The deal bonus evidence is most clearly in conflict with an optimal contracting
model. If mergers and acquisitions increased the value of acquiring firms, we would
expect CEOs to be incrementally compensated for completing these deals under an
optimal contracting model.163 Recall, however, that the evidence suggests that deal
one would expect restricted stock grants (or stock option grants for analogous reasons) to replace other
forms of managerial compensation to some extent, and not act as pure “add-ons” if equity compensation
grants were fully explainable as efficiency enhancers.
160
See supra note x and accompanying text.
161
See Raghuram G. Rahan & Julie Wulf, Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess? 31 (NBER
Working Paper 10494, May 2004).
162
See id.
163
Even if this were the case, however, deal bonuses would be somewhat problematic under an
optimal contracting theory. Holmstrom and Milgrom show that high-powered incentives directed at
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bonuses are not efficiency enhancing. They do not lead to increased share value, but they
do result in incremental compensation for CEOs, which means that deal bonuses result in
an incremental transfer of a slice of a fixed pie from shareholders to managers.164
The optimal contracting theory suggests that managerial appropriation through
deal bonuses should be modest or nonexistent. Deal bonuses are transparent and
relatively easy to monitor and can easily be avoided. If, as the evidence suggests, deal
bonuses simply represent an incremental transfer of shareholder wealth to managers,
directors acting in accordance with an optimal contracting model simply would not
sanction them.
The deal bonus evidence is much more consistent with a managerial power
model. Deal bonuses are plausibly justified as specific incentive compensation, i.e., if the
CEO completes the deal, she gets a bonus. Shareholders are told that the deal will be
value enhancing, (although market reaction and retrospective analysis tells us that few
are). Thus, deal bonuses are a means of increasing CEO compensation without
increasing outrage, and the fact that these bonuses produce incremental compensation
bolsters the persuasiveness of the managerial power model.165 This conclusion is
bolstered by another Grinstein and Hribar finding that cross-sectional variation in M&A
deal bonuses correlates with measures of CEO power.166
2. Stock Options
Because stock options arguably are pie-expanding, it is more difficult to isolate
incremental managerial appropriation and test the applicability of the corporate
governance models. I argued above, however, that evidence that option compensation
does not substitute for other compensation but is granted as a pure add-on suggests some
incremental appropriation. This incremental appropriation is inconsistent with an optimal
contracting model.
The fact that options exist is not inconsistent with an optimal contracting model
unless options can be shown to reduce shareholder value, and this has not been shown.
Options may result in both increased shareholder value and incremental managerial
appropriation, however, if they increase the pie. In this case, shareholders would not be
expected to just say no to stock option compensation.
Under the optimal contracting model, options, and incentive compensation
generally, are seen as part of the solution to the managerial agency cost problem.167
managerial activity A can be counterproductive if managerial activities B, C, and D are difficult to monitor.
See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note x. Thus, in order for deal bonuses to be value enhancing under an
optimal contracting model, we would have to assume that a manager’s share-based incentives were
sufficient to prevent excessive focus on deals and the neglect of other important tasks.
164
See supra note x and accompanying text.
165
See also Bebchuk & Fried, supra note x, at 127-30 (discussing managerial power explanation
for deal bonuses).
166
See Grinstein & Hribar, supra note x, at 4, 22.
167
See, e.g., Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note x, at 93; Murphy, supra note x, at 2515.
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Issuance of options should reduce managers’ tendency to shirk and extract private
benefits, and shareholders benefit by using incentive compensation to increase corporate
wealth, even if part of the incremental value is transferred to the managers. Under this
model, the arrangement reached is always optimal, by definition, but it is optimal within
the specific contracting environment. As a result, additional avenues of appropriation
that change the contracting environment can result in additional managerial value
appropriation under the optimal contracting model. Thus, the fact that option
compensation has supplemented (rather than substituted for) non-equity compensation
does not run counter to the optimal contracting theory.
Two factors, however, undermine the optimal contracting explanation of stock
options grants. First, the lack of any substitution of options for non-option compensation
is inconsistent with this model. As noted, conventional options provide a degree of low
risk compensation. Under an optimal contracting model, one would expect substitution
of options for non-option compensation at least to that extent.168 One would expect
managerial appropriation of this overlap to be small for the reasons discussed in Part III:
Direct monitoring of option compensation should not be difficult. Option payoffs are
uncertain, but the expected value of options can be modeled with reasonable certainty.
Moreover, option grants are within the unilateral control of directors.
Second, many option features vary from those expected under an optimal
contracting model, such as a lack of indexation of option exercise prices to markets and
the practice of repricing options following downturns.169 Other features, such as reload
rights, unnecessarily complicate option assessment and valuation.170 Through increasing
the difficulty and cost of monitoring, these features may increase managerial
appropriation via options, but under an optimal contracting model, directors should strip
options of these extraneous, complicating features, unless these features increase the pie,
which is doubtful. Thus, the apparently unwarranted degree of complexity observed in
practice further undermines the optimal contracting explanation for options.
By contrast, observed option practice is consistent with a managerial power view
of corporate governance. Options can be plausibly justified as incentive compensation,
which reduces outrage and permits executives to increase their total compensation.171 As
discussed, the justification for options is much more than just plausible, it is compelling.
Thus, one would expect the option boom to have led to significantly enhanced managerial
appropriation under this model. The managerial power explanation for stock option
practice is bolstered by findings in the two empirical studies described above that the cost
to managers of increased option grants is greater in well-governed companies172 and by
168

See supra note x and accompanying text.
See Bebchuk et al, supra note x, at 796-817, 821-24.
170
Options with a reload feature result in the issuance of new options to executives who exercise
options by surrendering stock. See id. at 831-34.
171
See Bebchuk et al, supra note x, at 812-15.
172
See Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note x, at 38 (finding that factors suggesting better
corporate governance, such as the presence of large shareholders or smaller boards, are associated with
increased “charges” for options grants); Benz et al, supra note x, at 3 (finding that weak institutional
controls are associated with greater stock option grants).
169
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findings in another study that significant shareholder opposition to a proposed stock
option plan results in reduced CEO pay in the following year.173 This latter finding
suggests that shareholder outrage is doing more work than optimal contracting.
3. Perks
Yermack’s finding that personal aircraft use is essentially free also seems more
consistent with the managerial power view than optimal contracting.174 First, if we
assume that corporate jets do not increase the pie, but instead transfer a slice from
shareholders to managers, directors acting in accordance with an optimal contracting
model should simply eliminate the perk. Second, even if one believes that perks of this
sort are efficiency enhancing, the lack of any significant substitution of perks
consumption for other compensation suggests incremental appropriation that is
inconsistent with an optimal contracting model since internal monitoring of perk
consumption should not be difficult. The pure add-on nature of the corporate jet perk is
much more consistent with a managerial power view.
The perk case is not completely closed, however. Yermack did not find perk
consumption to be associated with weak corporate governance, unlike the studies of deal
bonuses and stock option grants discussed above.175
4. Insider Trading
As noted, a recent study by Darren Roulstone has found evidence that insider
trading substitutes to some extent for conventional compensation. This evidence is
consistent with both a fixed slack view and optimal contracting. Interestingly, however,
Roulstone also shows that firms that restrict insider trading with trading windows rely
more heavily on incentive compensation than other firms.176 This observation runs
counter to the optimal contracting idea that firms will combat private benefit
opportunities (such as those associated with insider trading) with greater incentive
compensation. What are we to make of this finding? Perhaps, insider trading actually
does provide managerial incentives along the lines suggested by Manne177 and by Carlton
and Fischel,178 or does so at the fairly low level of informed trading that is permitted
under current U.S. law, in which case firms might want to provide other incentives when
they restrict insider trading. Alternatively, perhaps firms that restrict insider trading to
173

See Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, When is Enough, Enough? Market Reaction to
Highly Dilutive Stock Option Plans and the Subsequent Impact on CEO Compensation 24, 26 (working
paper, 2002) (examining stock option proposals made during the 1998 proxy season).
174
See Yermack, supra note x, at 15 and tbl. 3.
175
See id. at 4.
176
See Roulstone, supra note x, at 540-41.
177
See Henry Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966) (arguing that insider trading
can improve the efficiency of securities markets and of managerial compensation).
178
See Carlton & Fischel, supra note x, at 866-72. See also Jie Hu & Thomas H. Noe, 25 J. Bank.
& Fin. 681 (2001)(developing a model in which, under certain circumstances, permitting insider trading
results in an improved correlation between employee wealth and firm value thus increasing shareholder
wealth).
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trading windows are better governed, tend to believe in and rely more heavily on
incentive compensation, and thus tend to provide more total compensation.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The evidence described in the previous Part suggests that channels of
appropriation affect total managerial appropriation. Directors may believe that a
multifaceted executive compensation scheme with lots of bells and whistles represents
state of the art compensation design, but there is a largely unrecognized cost to this
complexity – incremental managerial appropriation. This Part will briefly highlight the
implications. The most obvious implication is that institutional investors and shareholder
advocates must recognize the link between compensation complexity and managerial
appropriation and require compelling justification for the inclusion of new forms of
compensation. Because opacity is central to appropriation under the external market
forces and managerial power models, a second implication for those who are skeptical of
the optimal contracting story is that enhanced disclosure may help limit appropriation. A
third implication is that legal rules matter: Deregulation of certain channels of
appropriation that are difficult to monitor and outside the unilateral control of directors
are problematic under any of the models considered in this article. Moreover, if one is
skeptical of the optimal contracting model, even limited deregulation permitting firms to
opt out of or into public enforcement schemes is troubling.
A. Channels Matter
If added channels of appropriation increase total managerial appropriation as the
evidence suggests, institutional investors and shareholder advocates must recognize the
link and demand that complex compensation schemes be justified. This analysis does not
suggest that firms should restrict themselves to paying straight cash salaries; some
incentive compensation clearly is worth the cost of additional managerial appropriation.
But incentive compensation can be simple or complex. Option reloads and other
complicating features should not be accepted at face value. Moreover, even if a new
form of compensation creates firm-value enhancing incentives, one can reasonably ask
whether the new compensation element should replace an existing form of compensation,
rather than being added to an ever more complex array of devices. For example, is firm
value enhanced by granting restricted stock in addition to stock options?
Of course, if the optimal contracting model adequately described managerial
compensation in publicly traded U.S. companies, shareholders would not need to worry
about a large class of potential avenues of appropriation that are not efficiency enhancing
and are under the unilateral control of directors. Directors would not provide these
benefits unless executives paid for them. Obviously one’s level of concern about
increasing compensation complexity and the increases in executive benefits, perks, and
similar compensation elements depends on how seriously one takes the managerial power
model. The evidence seems sufficient, however, to suggest that shareholders and their
advocates should demand compelling justification for the inclusion of new compensation
techniques and devices that may increase managerial appropriation.
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B. Disclosure Matters
Because opacity is central to appropriation under the external market forces and
managerial power models, detailed and timely mandatory disclosure of compensation
elements could help limit appropriation. Managers have an interest in concealing
compensation and will respond to new disclosure requirements by inventing new, opaque
compensation elements. Thus, adequate disclosure will be a continuing race between
regulators and corporate executives and their compensation consultants. This Part will
consider just two areas in which enhanced disclosure is needed: termination payments
and corporate contributions to a manager’s pet charity.
Severance payments, whether or not accompanied by a change of control,
represent a surging form of executive compensation. I have discussed the opacity of
supplemental executive retirement programs and golden parachute arrangements and the
need for enhanced disclosure of these items.179 David Yermack recently has investigated
non-contractual executive severance benefits, colloquially known as golden
handshakes.180 His findings are similar. In a study of golden handshakes provided to
Fortune 500 CEOs who left their jobs between 1996 and 2002, Yermack found that many
of the benefits provided were opaque to shareholders.181 Particularly opaque were
enhancements to pension programs, which constituted over 20% of the total benefits paid
in his sample.182 In addition, about 40% of the benefits took the form of consulting or
non-competition arrangements or compensation as board chairman, all of which are
somewhat opaque and plausibly justifiable to shareholders.183 The SEC should require
listed companies to value and clearly disclose all contractually promised severance
benefits at the time such arrangements are negotiated and annually thereafter, as well as
any non-contractual benefits provided.184 The latter, which are particularly suspect,
should be separately disclosed.
Corporate charitable contributions generally are not covered by the SEC’s
mandatory disclosure regime and generally are not disclosed to shareholders.185 This
179
180

See supra notes x and y and accompanying text.
See David Yermack, Golden Handshakes: Rewards for CEOs Who Leave (working paper,

Aug. 2004).
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See id. at 3.
See id. at 35 tbl. IV.
183
See id. Yermack found in addition that larger golden handshakes tended to be more opaque.
See id. at 3. Other evidence was mixed. Yermack found no evidence that golden handshakes served as ex
post settling up for past over- or under-compensation, but he did find that payments were associated with
foregone future compensation and evidence that payments in the case of involuntary termination serves as
damage control. These latter findings are consistent with optimal contracting theory generally. See id. at 4.
184
In fact, the SEC should mandate such disclosure of all executive compensation elements. See
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note x, at 193.
185
See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of
Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 581 (1994) (noting that “the federal securities regulations do not
require disclosure of whether a corporation has made any charitable contributions, what the value of such
contributions may have been, or which organizations may have received such contributions” ); Victor
Brudney & Allen Ferrell, Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1191, 1201 (2002) (noting
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lack of disclosure enables executive to direct contributions to pet charities and receive
psychic and perhaps material benefits without triggering shareholder outrage. Of course,
some corporate contributions will be trumpeted. The whole idea behind sponsorship of
the Metropolitan Opera186 or Masterpiece Theater187 is public exposure and approbation.
Other contributions may provide private benefits to managers, however, without broad
public disclosure and the attendant outrage. Large contributions to the CEO’s alma mater
or favorite hospital are likely to fall in this category and prove problematic under the
managerial power model.
Mandated public disclosure of significant corporate charitable contributions and
officer or director ties with recipients would help combat managerial appropriation under
the managerial power model. Once disclosure is made, large contributions will tend to
produce outrage unless these contributions can be plausibly justified, and it would seem
to be even more difficult to justify large payments to the CEO’s favorite charities than it
is to justify ostensibly business-related perks. This analysis bolsters the case for
mandatory disclosure of significant corporate contributions.188
Enhanced disclosure is a double-edged sword. Increased disclosure requirements
concerning compensation element “A” may lead executives to favor less efficient, but
more opaque, compensation element “B”. Thus, in order for mandatory disclosure to
enhance shareholder value, disclosure practice must stay tightly attuned to compensation
practice, effectively preventing executives from circumventing the requirements.189 In
addition, enhanced disclosure may lead to executive compensation ratcheting upwards as
firms benchmark compensation off of one another.190 Nonetheless, the benefits of
enhanced disclosure seem to outweigh the costs, and disclosure remains the most
promising avenue of attack against runaway compensation and appropriation.
C. Legal Rules Matter
For most of the twentieth century, the dominant theme in the evolution of
corporate law was the movement from mandatory rules to an enabling framework.191
general rule and explaining that charitable awards that constitute executive compensation are an exception
to the general rule). But see NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 303A.02 (2003) (requiring a listed
company to disclose in its annual proxy statement or annual report any contribution to a charitable
organization in which a director serves as an executive officer, if such contribution exceeds the greater of
$1 million or 2% of such charitable organization’s gross revenues).
186
Prior to the withdrawal of its sponsorship in 2004, Texaco underwrote radio broadcasts of the
Metropolitan Opera for 63 years. See Verena Dobnik, Met Opera, Texaco End Partnership After 63 Years,
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Apr. 29, 2004, at E3.
187
Mobil (and subsequently ExxonMobil) sponsored PBS presentations of Masterpiece Theater
for 30 years prior to ending its association with the show in 2004. See David Bianculli, Television: No
One Bidding on Masterpiece, N.Y. Daily News, Jan. 12, 2004, at 79.
188
See, e.g., Kahn, supra note x (arguing for mandatory disclosure of corporate contributions
amounts, identities of recipients, and director interlocks).
189
See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note x, at 194.
190
See Bebchuk et al, supra note x, at 791.
191
This is an often told story. See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing
Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911, 1974 (1996) (describing the evolution from a set of rigid
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Shareholders may have benefited from this movement generally, but it is likely that
managerial appropriation has increased as a result, as well. This section focuses on three
potential channels of managerial appropriation that are problematic under either the
optimal contracting or managerial power models, and argues that deregulation of these
channels has led or could lead to further increases in managerial appropriation.
Moreover, if one is skeptical of the optimal contracting view, even limited deregulation
allowing companies to opt-into or out of prohibitory legal regimes is problematic.
The taking of corporate opportunities, self-dealing transactions, and insider
trading have similar implications under the models presented. These transactions present
a high risk of significant value appropriation under either model. The availability of
these avenues of appropriation tends to shift the optimal contract in favor of the manager
and provide a low salience outlet for additional compensation.
As noted, it is difficult to monitor the appropriation of private benefits through
these channels. Insider trading can be concealed. Self-dealing can be concealed and,
even if disclosed, the profits from self-dealing transactions can be opaque. Managers
may misrepresent the degree of fit between a potential opportunity and the corporate plan
in order to appropriate such opportunities for their own accounts.192 Thus, these avenues
of appropriation are problematic even under the optimal contracting model.
I argued in Part III that mandatory legal prohibitions could provide extracontractual enforcement mechanisms and sanctions that could reduce the agency costs
associated with these practices under an optimal contracting model. I also suggested that
“opt-out” deregulation should not be problematic under this model because directors
could simply opt back into the public regulatory system if doing so increased shareholder
value. However, if after reviewing the evidence presented in Part V, one is skeptical of
the optimal contracting model, this type of opt-out deregulation might be no better than
wholesale deregulation.
In other words, if one subscribes to the managerial power view, one would not
expect directors to pick the regulatory regime that maximizes shareholder value. Because
insider trading, self-dealing, and the taking of corporate opportunities offer easily
camouflaged compensation, and the private benefits from these activities may represent a
large fraction of the corporate cost, managers could be expected to persuade directors to
allow them to utilize these low saliency channels to increase their overall appropriation.
Of course, there also is a plausible justification for permitting the practices or at
least permitting case-by-case determinations instead of reintroducing or maintaining
mandatory corporate law prohibitions. For example, self-dealing could be mutually
beneficial if the manager is also the owner of a key supplier. Allowing the manager to

formal rules to an enabling approach). In recent years the tide has reversed, although recent regulation
places much more emphasis on disclosure than substantive obligations. See, e.g., Sarbanes Oxley Act of
2002.
192
See Talley, supra note x, at y.
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take a corporate opportunity can be a win-win if the corporation is less able or unable to
exploit the opportunity.193
In my view, however, these justifications are too weak to counteract the agency
costs resulting from the lack of mandatory corporate law prohibitions, at least in the case
of public companies where mutually beneficial appropriation of corporate opportunities
or other self-dealing should be rare.194 In any event, policy makers should recognize the
potential for appropriation offered by these channels and the insufficiency of opt-in
regulation if the optimal contracting model is not fully descriptive of the contracting
environment.
VII. CONCLUSION
If the most striking trend in executive compensation over the past several decades
has been its seemingly inexorable rise upward,195 a close second is its steadily increasing
complexity and opacity. These trends may be related. As little as twenty years ago, cash
salary was the dominant form of compensation.196 Today executive stock options have
supplanted cash salary as the largest single component of the average large company
CEO’s pay package,197 but options are only a small part of the picture. Modern CEO
compensation packages include cash, options, restricted stock, phantom stock and
options, a wide variety of bonus opportunities, not to mention an ever expanding array of
benefits and perks, many of which, such as SERPs and deferred compensation plans,
represent significant financial commitments by shareholders.
In addition to the increasing complexity of conventional compensation and benefit
programs, relaxation of corporate fiduciary law has led to increased executive access to
non-conventional appropriation channels such as self-dealing and the taking of corporate
opportunities. Even with enhanced SEC disclosure requirements, quantifying and
evaluating executive compensation today is a much more difficult proposition than it was
twenty years ago. This article has argued that this increasing complexity and opacity has
been costly for shareholders. Even if one subscribes to the optimal contracting model of
corporate governance, access to certain of these channels of appropriation has likely led
to an overall increase in managerial appropriation. If one is skeptical of the optimal
contracting story and think it more likely that compensation is limited by external market
forces or saliency and outrage in accordance with a managerial power view, then one
must conclude that this increased complexity and opacity has led to a very significant rise
in the manager’s share of corporate value.
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However, these justifications are much more persuasive in the close corporation context. See
Brudney & Clark, supra note x, at 1001-06.
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See Brudney & Clark, supra note x, at 1022-24 (presenting a cost-benefit analysis supporting a
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APPENDIX
Note: In the diagram below, the optimal investment in contracting and monitoring occurs
at point a resulting in residual slack of b and total agency costs of c.

Figure 1
Minimizing Managerial Agency Costs
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Figure 2
Optimal Contracting Against an External Market Forces Limitation
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Note: As depicted in the diagram below, for a given level of contracting and monitoring
expenditure, the addition of an avenue of appropriation results in increased residual slack
and total agency costs. Agency costs are minimized in the new environment with
investment of a in contracting and monitoring, resulting in residual loss of b and total
agency costs of c.
Figure 3
Effect of an Added Avenue of Appropriation on the Optimal Contract
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